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INTRODUCTION
In the early summer of 1990 the Microsoft Corporation
released version 3.0 of its Windows product, an operating
environment with a graphical user interface (GUI).' The
* 1993 Nicolas P. Terry. All Rights Reserved.
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Giftos, Tracy Litzinger, and Jeff McPherson, my research assistants.
1. Windows 3.0, 3.1, and earlier versions are not in themselves operating sys-
tems (or system software or OS) such as Microsoft/IBM DOS, Microsoft's NT, or
IBM's OS/2. They require and operate "on top of" DOS 3.1 or later. Notwithstand-
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introduction of Windows 3.0 was accompanied by a media
blitz. Advertising of the new product was powerful and
well directed,2 and Microsoft and third party application
vendors had stockpiled software designed for the new oper-
ating environment. 3 The product opened to near unani-
ing, with the release of Windows 3.1, Microsoft began to describe Windows as an
operating system. See Windows 3.1 outer packaging.
Operating systems are responsible for the basic operation of the computer, how
it manages software and data files, allocation of processing power, memory manage-
ment, input and output devices (e.g., the mouse and the video output) and peripher-
als such as printers, CD-ROMs, modems, and scanners. An OS should be
distinguished from application programs, which perform most of the tasks PCs are
used for, e.g., word processing, spreadsheets, and databases. In general, a computer
will have only one OS, but multiple application programs. However, some sophisti-
cated OSs (e.g., IBM's OS/2) contain subsets of other OSs (e.g., DOS and Windows
3.1). In addition to an OS and applications, PCs run two other types of software.
Utilities are accessories designed to fine-tune or supplement the OS. They provide
everything from disk de-fragmentation to memory allocation information. Mini-ap-
plications, or Applets, are small application programs that accessorize the PC. For
example, Microsoft 3.1 ships with a Calendar and a flat database (Cardfile).
2. Microsoft's basic advertisements in the computer "buff" books were di-
rected at its installed base of Windows 2.1 users (e.g., "Look familiar? Then this $50
upgrade will look great," Microsoft advertisement, PC MAO., July, 1990, at 196.),
and the assumed mass of DOS users apparently dissatisfied with the complexities of
DOS (e.g., "Kiss it Goodbye. Introducing New Windows 3.0" [over a picture of a
DOS C> prompt], Microsoft advertisement, PC MAG., Sept. 11, 1990, at 2-3.).
Microsoft's initial media roll-out of Windows 3.0 cost $10 million. John Markoff,
American Industry Faces the Challenge of Tougher Times, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990,
§ 1, at 31.
3. Microsoft had been encouraging third party vendors to develop or upgrade
Windows programs for more than a year prior to the public announcement of Win-
dows 3.0. Windows 3.0 Brings Icons, Multitasking, and Ends DOS's 640K Program
Limit, PC MAO., July, 1990, at 33; Peter H. Lewis, In the Wings: 3 New Ways to
Handle Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1990, at C10; Peter H. Lewis, Windows, Version
3.0, Steps Out, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1990, at C9. Indeed, there were so many Win-
dows products at Comdex, the annual computer trade fair, in the fall of 1990 that the
organizers announced a spin-off Windows fair. The Executive Computer: Who Has
Really Tried Windows?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, § 3, at 8.
It was soon estimated that Windows application programs would sell 3.8 million
in 1991 and 7.7 million in 1992. Microsoft Expects Sales to Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1991, at D5. See actual sales figures infra text accompanying note 8.
Microsoft itself had several new or upgraded programs which it heavily pro-
moted at the same time as Windows 3.0 was announced. E.g., "Microsoft Project for
Windows," Microsoft Advertisement, PC MAO., July, 1990, at 2-3. Indeed, after the
initial roll-out of Windows, Microsoft concentrated much of its media efforts on its
own Windows applications. See, e.g., "With Windows, the future takes shape. With
our Windows applications, it soars." Microsoft Advertisement, PC MAG., Oct. 30,
1990, at C2-4.
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mous enthusiastic reviews,4 and sold almost three million
copies in the first seven months following its introduction.'
Subsequently, Microsoft released Windows 3.16 and Win-
dows for Workgroups 3.1. 7 By the Spring of 1993 Microsoft
was shipping one million copies of Windows per month,8
and analysts believed that somewhere between twenty-five
and thirty million copies of Windows were in circulation by
the middle of 1993. In the third quarter of 1992, sales of
key Windows applications such as word processors and
spreadsheets overtook their DOS rivals,9 and in the first
4. See, e.g., Windows 3.0 Brings Icons, Multitasking, and Ends DOS's 640K
Program Limit, PC MAG., July, 1990, at 33.
A funny thing's happening on the road to OS/2. Microsoft Windows has
turned into the dazzling multitasking operating system that OS/2 is still
struggling to become. The release of Microsoft Windows 3.0 represents the
best implementation of a graphical environment for PC users available
anywhere.
See also Peter H. Lewis, Window's, Version 3.0, Steps Out, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
1990, at Cl; Peter H. Lewis, Fresh Windows of Opportunity for PC Users, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1990, § 3, at 9; Peter H. Lewis, What is Windows 3.0 Really Like?,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1990, at C9; Edward Rothstein, The Computers that Mimic a
Desk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990, at C1. See criticisms of Windows infra text accom-
panying note 44.
5. Stuart J. Johnson, Dangerous Liaisons, INFoWoRLD, Apr. 8, 1991, at 44.
There are approximately 40 million DOS users in the United States. John Markoff,
Microsoft's Payoff For Persistence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, § 1, at 31. Microsoft's
own projection, prior to launch, was that Windows would be loaded on four out of
five DOS machines by 1992. Andrew Pollack, Microsoft Tries Again to Set A Stan-
dard, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1990, at D1. By early 1991, Microsoft was predicting Win-
dows sales at 6 million for 1991. Peter H. Lewis, Operating Systems for PC's Grow
More Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, § 3, at 7. The massive acceptance of
Windows 3.0 was helped by the early announcement by more than 30 hardware ven-
dors that the environment would be included with their machines. Andrew Pollack,
Microsoft Item Gains Strong Backing, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1990, at D2; Edward
Rothstein, The Computers that Mimic a Desk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990, at C1.
6. Microsoft to Launch Windows Ads on TV, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 1992.
7. Paul Andrews, Premiere Performance-Curtain Raised on New Program,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at B7. WFW is a peer-to-peer networking product
based on Windows 3.1 with additions (e.g., file and resource sharing, netware such as
e-mail, and some enhancements to File Manager and the clipboard). See generally
Amy Cortese, VFW Beta Blazes Trail to Chicago, Microsoft Corp's Windows for
Workgroups Brings 32-Bit Microsoft Windows Closer, PC WK., June 7, 1993, at 8.
WFW 3.11 was released in late 1993.
8. James Coates, Microsoft Tries to Close a Window to Competitors, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 1, 1993, at C3.
9. Andrew Kantor, Registration Drives; Software Product Registration Trends,
PC MAG., Feb. 9, 1993, at 32. According to the Software Publishers Association,
total DOS application sales totaled $644 million in the period, Windows sales were
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quarter of 1993, sales of Windows applications had over-
taken DOS applications by a margain of $669 million to
$502 million.10 Overall, sales of the Windows environment
and Windows applications programs solidified Microsoft's
position as the dominant and most successful software de-
veloper in the world."
Against this overwhelmingly successful commercial
background, Apple Corporation filed suit, charging
Microsoft with violating Apple's copyrights covering the in-
terface of the Macintosh computer. Litigation had already
been recognized as a dominant, if dubious, symbol of the
maturation of the computer industry in the 1990s.12
Although there had been a rash of litigious moves by major
hardware and software developers,13 the litigation between
$487 million. Id. See also Jane Morrissey, PC Application Sales are Up, PC WK.,
Nov. 30, 1992, at 166. Overall, in 1992, Windows applications almost doubled in
1992, Macintosh rose 17%, and DOS applications declined 16%. New Users, Appli-
cations Sales Reach All-Time High, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 20, 1993.
10. L.R. Shannon, Windows Widens Its Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at C6.
By this time Windows word processors were outselling DOS word processors by
$122.8 million to $53.9 million. Windows Sources, Oct., 1993, at 26. In late January
1993 Word Perfect announced that it would introduce no further major upgrades to
its famous DOS word processor, but it would concentrate on Windows and other
GUI platforms. PC WK., Jan. 31, 1994, at 3.
11. Microsoft's 1992 revenue was $2.8 billion. Its net profit margin is 25.7%.
William J. Cook & David Bowermaster, The New Rockerfeller, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Feb. 15, 1993, at 64. Microsoft accounts for 44% of U.S. personal
computer software revenues. Microsoft to Challenge Trademark Ruling, REUTERS,
Feb. 25, 1993. In 1992, Microsoft's sales of Windows accounted for revenue of $406
million, DOS for $476 million, and application programs for $1.3 billion. James
Coates, Microsoft Tries to Close a Window to Competitiors, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1993,
at C3. Microsoft's 1993 revenues totaled $3.75 billion, including its first billion dol-
lar quarter ($1.04 billion in the fourth quarter). Paul Andrews, Microsoft Tops $1
Billion, SEATTLE TIMES, July 29, 1993, at D1.
12. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer; When Computing Power
is Generated by the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, § 3, at 4; A Market's Identity
Crisis, BRANDWEEK, Sept. 1991; Law Holds Key to High-Tech, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Jan. 6, 1991, at F1.
13. Most of the disputes surrounding computer software are fought in the copy-
right arena. However, Quarterdeck Office Systems has been awarded a patent on a
windowed multi-tasking system. The patent is titled, "An Improved Display System
and Memory Architecture and Method for Displaying Images in Windows on a
Video Display." Patent is Won by Quarterdeck, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1989, at D4.
For an excellent primer on the protection of computer software, see M.A. EPSTEIN,
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1989) 363-430; see also Motorola, Inc. v.
Hitachi, Ltd., 750 F. Supp. 1319 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (involving microprocessors); Intel
Corporation's various disputes with Advanced Micro Devices Inc., over the 386
[Vol. 47:93
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Apple and Microsoft has dominated the commercial and
legal stages.
In fact, it is for both commercial and legal reasons that
the importance of the Windows litigation goes far beyond
the spectacle of two computer giants publicly warring. Un-
doubtedly copyright protection extends to the literal con-
tent of a software operating system or application
program.14  In contrast, the Windows litigation addresses
the scope of protection extended to a non-literal feature,
the user interface.' 5 This question, frequently referred to as
the "look and feel" issue, has immensely important com-
mercial dimensions. First, in the short term, the victor in
the Windows case would have a disproportionately large
role in shaping this decade's personal computer interface.
Second, in the medium to long term, interface standardiza-
tion, regardless of whether it is on a Windows-like desktop
metaphor, undoubtedly will continue. As such, the Win-
dows case had the potential of predicting the degree of in-
tellectual property protection that interface developers can
expect. 16
chip, Consortium to Buy Intel Computer, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 13, 1990, at D1; Court
Reverses Ruling on Intel, N.Y. TiMEs, June 7, 1993 at D3; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Bor-
land Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993) (involving a copyright claim be-
tween Lotus 1-2-3 and Borland's Quattro Pro and Quattro Pro for Windows
spreadsheet applications); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc.,
892 F.2d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1989); OmniTel and Ven-Tel (involving modem escape se-
quences) NEWSBYTEs, April 25, 1991; Borland against Symantec for alleged trade
secret violations involving the hiring of Gene Wang by Symantec; criminal trade
secret indictments against Wang and Symantec CEO Gordon Eubanks were re-
turned by a California grand jury in early 1993, Indictments Don't Deter Symantec,
PC WK., Mar. 8, 1993 at 1; Computer Associates International, Inc., successful in
$8.5 million trade secrets suit against American Fundware, Inc., Verdict in Software
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at C15.
14. See, e.g., RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY,
1.02 (1991 Cum. Supp. No. 2) [hereinafter NIMMER]; Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kauff-
man, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (defining "computer program").
15. In contrast to cases where the interface is admittedly different but the un-
derlying code is alleged to be copied, see Accolade, Inc. v. Distinctive Software, Inc.,
No. C9020202RFP, 1990 WL 180239 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 1990); see also NIMMER,
supra note 14, at 1.03[4][b], 1.08, 1.09.
16. For example, the ability to run Windows is a practical requirement for any
OS in the short term market. Obviously, Microsoft's NT has that ability, as has
IBM's OS/2 by virtue of a licensing agreement with Microsoft. However, Microsoft
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:93
This article traces the course of the Apple-Microsoft
litigation, providing a commercial and technological per-
spective. It includes an analysis of the major cases concern-
ing non-literal copying in the software arena, and concludes
that Microsoft's apparent victory in the litigation17 was con-
sistent with a jurisprudence reflecting a steady decline in
the degree of copyright protection granted to user
interfaces.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAPHICAL
USER INTERFACE
The Xerox Corporation developed the desktop meta-
phor/windows style interface at its Palo Alto Research
Center (PARC) in the mid-1970s. It originated with a com-
puter language, called Smalltalk, which accommodated
non-keyboard (mouse) input and overlapping windows. 8
Subsequently, Xerox developed the Star workstation pro-
ject which first mated mouse input with graphical images.' 9
Considering that the GUI would require hardware so ex-
pensive as to render the project impractical, Xerox decided
has not granted licenses to other OS manufacturers such as Sun Microsystems which
has demonstrated an OS which can run Windows applications. See John Markoff,
Sun Operating System Is Aimed at PC Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at D6.
Asked to comment, a Microsoft vice-president intimated that Microsoft would main-
tain its competitive edge by adding new technologies rather than rushing to the
courts. Id. It should also be noted that the IBM-Microsoft cross-licensing agree-
ment came to an end on September 17, 1993. This is likely to hinder OS/2 in at-
tempting to run Windows 4.0 or DOS 7.0. See, e.g., Amy Cortese, Will OS/2 Roads
Diverge With MS-DOS 7.0; Incompatibilities Between IBM's OS/2 Operating System
and Future Versions of Microsoft's MS-DOS 7.0 Operating System, PC WK., Aug. 23,
1993, at 1, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1.
17. At the time of writing Microsoft had been granted summary judgment. No
decision regarding any appeal had been made public.
18. Smalltalk has evolved into an object oriented programming language which
competes with C++. Versions of the Smalltalk language are currently available from
several independent vendors. See Jack E. Gold, Reusability Promise Hinges on Li-
braries, SOF-WARE MAO., Jan., 1993, at 86. It is available as a Windows program-
ming language. Kaare Christian, Smalltalk: The Granddaddy of OOPS Meets
Windows, PC MAG., May 28, 1991, at 49. Smalltalk V 2.0 for OS/2 was released in
September, 1992, Larry J. Seltzer, Cross-platform Tools Make a Splash, PC WK.,
Dec. 28, 1992, at 75.
19. However, only one Window could be active. AT&T has recently begun
asserting a patent it says applies to allowing multiple Windows to be active. John
Markoff, Patent Action on Software by AT&T, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at D1.
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not to market it.20 In December 1979, Xerox twice demon-
strated the never copyrighted Smalltalk to Apple personnel
visiting PARC, including Steven Jobs, who was then the
president of Apple.2 ' Subsequently, and pursuant to a li-
censing agreement with Xerox, Apple began to develop the
Lisa computer as a hardware system for Smalltalk.22 At this
time, Jobs also recruited some Xerox personnel from PARC
to work for Apple on the Lisa project.23
At the heart of Apple's efforts was the availability of
Motorolas 32-bit 68000 microprocessor for personal com-
puter application. The 68000 proved to be sufficiently pow-
erful for Apple to reproduce the bit mapped GUI that
previously had required workstation processing power,24
the technical requirement that had led Xerox to abandon
any leading role in the development of a GUI. Introduced
in January 1983, the Lisa was a $10,000 flop when it was
compared to IBM's less powerful $2,000 PCs. However,
the more competitive Macintosh, its interface derived from
Lisa, was announced by Apple Corporation in January
1984.25 Aspects of the visual displays of both Lisa and Mac-
intosh are registered copyrights.26
20. QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 278 (3d ed. 1992).
21. Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1543-44 (N.D.
Cal. 1990); see, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006,
1017-20 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
22. 734 F. Supp. at 1543-44.
23. 799 F. Supp. at 1018; QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICrIONARY 278 (3d ed.
1992).
24. 799 F. Supp. at 1018-19.
25. Andrew Pollack, Apple Expands Product Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1984, at
D1. Judge Walker, the second judge to oversee the later Apple-Microsoft litigation
summed up the breakthrough as follows:
In developing the Macintosh computer operating system software, Apple
made one of the major commercial breakthroughs of the 1980s. The
graphic user interface generated by the Macintosh system software consists
of windows, icons, pull-down menus, and other images or visual displays
projected on the computer screen. The Macintosh user interface proved so
intuitive that users were able fairly quickly to learn how to manipulate the
screen displays and mouse and thus accomplish what had theretofore been
the daunting task of learning to operate a computer. This breakthrough
vaulted Apple to the top of the personal computer industry.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(footnote omitted).
26. Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1544 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
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Apple introduced the Macintosh with a spectacular
commercial during the January 1984 Super Bowl. 27
Although highly regarded, the Macintosh failed to establish
itself as a business machine until the 1986 release of the
LaserWriter, a laser printer utilizing Adobe Systems Post-
Script printer language.28 This combination of printer and
computer quickly set the benchmark for desktop publish-
ing, giving Apple a product that it could market beyond the
school and home markets.29
By this time, the Intel Corporation, the preeminent
manufacturer of microprocessors for IBM-compatibles, had
developed chips that were able to rival Motorola products
in handling complex bit-mapped graphics.30 Microsoft, al-
ready a Macintosh GUI applications developer, first dis-
closed its Windows project for previously character-based
IBM compatibles in late 1983.31 However, its final stage of
development reportedly was "buggy," and its introduction
was delayed until 1985.32 Even then, Windows was per-
ceived as slow, 33 and it was not until the 1987 introduction
of version 2.0 that the environment began to make serious
converts.3
4
Microsoft was not alone in seeking to produce the first
PC GUI to challenge the Macintosh.35 However, early
27. Phillip H. Dougherty, The Other Superbowl: I.B.M. vs. Apple, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1984, at Dl. The 1984 Superbowl was won by the Los Angeles Raiders
over the Washington Redskins, 38-9.
28. QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 367 (3d ed. 1992). Of particular
importance is PostScripts outline font technology. Id. at 470-72.
29. An additional reason was the shift from the closed-bus design of the Macin-
tosh to the open-bus design of the Mac II in 1987, encouraging the development of
third party peripherals. QuE's COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY 366 (3d ed. 1992).
30. Initially the 286, subsequently the 386 and 486 families. See infra note 47.
The Pentium chip, renamed from 586 to ease trademark protection, was introduced
in mid-1993.
31. Microsoft Displays Window Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1983, at D4.
32. Peter H. Lewis, Special Insurance Coverage Could Prevent Costly Losses,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1984, at C6.
33. See, e.g., Nico Krohn, Not as Easy as 1-2-3, INFOWORLD, Apr. 1, 1991, at 40.
34. Andrew Pollack, Microsoft Tries Again to Set a Standard, N.Y. TIMES, May
7, 1990, at D1. In contrast, version 3.0 was considered a breakthrough because of its
memory management techniques and its graphics.
35. Including GEM (Graphics Environment Manager) from Digital Research,
Topview from IBM, and Visicorp (Visi-On). Erik Sandberg-Diment, Macintosh
Marketing Overcomes its Drawbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1985, at C4; Andrew
100 [Vol. 47:93
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graphical or windowing environments were poorly received.
Among the problems with the early environments were the
insufficiency of programs to run under the new environ-
ments, more could be achieved with less by running inte-
grated software,36 and the then current video displays were
ill-suited to displaying a collection of relatively small icons
or windows.37 By the time Microsoft announced version
3.0,38 the only real contenders in the mass market GUI
competition were Apple, with its proprietary Macintosh op-
erating system, 39 OS/2,4° UNIX, 41 and NextStep. 42
Pollack, Integrating the Software, N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 1, 1983, at D2; Erik Sandberg-
Diment, "Windows" and "Gateways" Loom in Near Future, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1983, at C6. In 1988, Microsoft and IBM announced the readiness of Presentation
Manager, the GUI front end for OS/2. Peter H. Lewis, New Graphics Interface,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1988, at C10; see, e.g., Nico Krohn, Not as Easy as 1-2-3, IN-
FoWoRLD, Apr. 1, 1991, at 40. The different GUI front-end developed and used by
IBM in OS/2 2.x is called WorkPlace Shell. Additionally, the narrower multitasking
challenge for machines using Intel's 386 has been addressed by software packages
such as DESQview from Quarterdeck Office Systems. A more GUI version
DESQview/X was introduced in 1992. Paul Lavin, DESQview/X Graphical User In-
terface, PC USER, June, 1992, at 42.
36. The 1980s also saw the introduction of several fully integrated software
packages such as Lotus's Symphony, Ashton-Tate's Framework and Microsoft's
Works. David E. Sanger, Lead Widens for a Few, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1984, at B33.
Typically, such programs would contain a word processor, spreadsheet, database,
and communications software all sporting similar interfaces. The early-1990s have
shown a tendency to abandon horizontally integrated software for the business envi-
ronment in favor of an integrating environment in which disparate programs from
different manufacturers are designed to work cooperatively. Christina Cordova &
Nate Zelnick, Professional Write Plus Fills the Windows Word Processing Gap, PC
MAG., Apr. 16, 1991, at 55.
37. Erik Sandberg-Diment, Value of Windowing is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1984, § 1, at 35.
38. Subsequent to the release of version 3.0, eight 32-bit operating systems
were considered viable contenders: NeXT, Taligent's Pink, Solaris, IBM's OS, IBMI
Apple/Motorola's PowerOpen (which will power the PCOpen chip), Microsoft's NT,
Chicago (Windows 4.0) and Cairo (Microsoft's object-oriented OS). Alyson Pres-
ton, 32-Bit OSs Ready to Take Hold, PC WK., Mar. 29, 1993, at 103-04. In August,
1993, Motorola (the joint developer of the PowerPC with Apple and IBM) an-
nounced that it had reached agreement with Microsoft to allow it to modify the NT
OS to work on the power PC. Ronald Yates, Motorola Buys Rights to Windows,
PHOENIX GAZETrE, Aug. 10, 1993, at B9.
39. System 7, the latest version of the Macintosh operating system was intro-
duced in May, 1991. System 7 competes directly with Windows 3.0 (in fact, with 3.1
which was introduced in mid-1991) with regard to virtual memory and font technol-
ogy. See, e.g., Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at C1.
40. Peter H. Lewis, In the Wings, 3 New Ways to Handle Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1990, at C10; see, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, War for the Desktop, N.Y. TIMES,
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Oct. 9, 1990, at C10. Additionally, PC/GEOS, a new entry, has been well received.
E.g., Milt Jones, GeoWorks Ensemble Lays the Foundation For A Brave New OS,
PC MAG., Feb. 12, 1991, at 29. Another kernel for the development of various APIs
is X-Window. Kaare Christian, The X Window System: A Universal Graphic Inter-
face, PC MAG., May 28, 1991, at 323. The relatively poor initial acceptance of OS/2
in the marketplace coupled with Microsoft's continual development of Windows has
led to several public restatements or reassessments of the IBM-Microsoft relation-
ship. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, IBM and Microsoft Try for a Truce, N.Y, TIMES, Nov.
19, 1989, § 3, at 13; Andrew Pollack, I.B.M. Reported in Dispute with Microsoft on
Software, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at D8; Andrew Pollack, I.B.M. and Microsoft
Revise Software Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at D1; John Markoff, I.B.M. Going
on Offensive to Promote Key Software, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at D1; Andrew
Pollack, One Day Junior Got Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, § 3, at 1. Microsoft
was selling only about 150,000 copies of OS/2 annually. For some speculation on the
present and future relationship between Windows and OS/2, see John Dvorak, OS/
2's Flop: Why Did it Happen?, PC MAG., May 14, 1991, at 81; see also John Markoff,
Rift on Software Arouses Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at D1.
After the effective breakup of the joint IBM-Microsoft development of OS/2,
IBM released OS/2 2.0 in 1992. This release garnered considerably more favorable
reviews than OS/1.0, and has been better received in the marketplace. See, e.g., John
Dvorak & Paul Somerson, Good Things Can't Last Forever: The Command Line
Gives Way To The GUI, PC MAG., July, 1992, at 90; Michael J. Miller, The 9th An-
nual Awards for Technical Excellence, PC MAG., Dec. 22, 1992, at 108. OS/2 2.1 was
released in mid-1993 to very favorable reviews. See Bill Machrone, Your Next Oper-
ating System?, PC MAG., Sept. 14, 1993, at 87; John C. Dvorak, OS/2 Then and Now,
PC MAG., Sept. 14, 1993, at 93.
IBM and Microsoft settled their intellectual property issues in the summer of
1992. Larry Black, IBM and Microsoft Settle their Disputes, THE INDEPENDENT,
June 30, 1992.
41. UNIX is the pre-eminent operating system (or rather systems-there are
approximately 25 different species of UNIX) for workstation and mini-computer
platforms. A leading version of the UNIX system is produced by Santa Cruz Opera-
tion Inc.; that version, like DOS and Windows, runs on Intel-based computers. Law-
rence M. Fisher, Small Software Maker Is Taking Giant Steps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1991, at D1; see, e.g., John Markoff, Fresh Momentum for UNIX, But Still Hurdles to
Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, § 3, at 10; Quadibur R. Safi, Santa Cruz Operation's
SCO UNIX Deserves Its Place in the Sun, PC WK., Aug. 9, 1993, at 81 (previewing
SCO version 3.0). Sun MicroSystems also has announced a version of its Solaris OS
which will run on IBM-compatibles. John Markoff, Sun Operating System is Aimed
at PC Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at D6. For a comprehensive comparison
of UNIX to Windows NT, see Tom Yager & Ben Smith, Is Unix Dead?, ByrE, Sept.,
1992, at 134. In March, 1993, six leading UNIX OS developers (IBM, Hewlett-Pack-
ard, Sun Microsystems, Santa Cruz Operation, Univel, and UNIX System Laborato-
ries) announced an agreement to standardize their UNIX OS products in the face of
Windows NT. Steve Lohr, 6 Rivals to Head Off A New Microsoft Challenge, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at C3; see, e.g., John Pallatto & Norvin Leach, Unified UNIX is
Battle Cry of COSE Group, PC WK., Mar. 22, 1993, at 1 (detailing aspects of the so-
called Common Open Software Environment or COSE).
42. The NextStep OS, which is UNIX-based, was developed by Steve Jobs to
run on his Next workstation. A version of NextStep has been developed that will
run on high end Intel-based machines. See, e.g., Mark Potts, Leaning Hard on
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II. A TECHNICAL AND COMMERCIAL PRIMER
Although immensely popular, Windows 3.x43 has not
escaped criticism. The first release was not completely sta-
ble particularly when running DOS applications. However,
most bugs had been removed by the time version 3.1 was
shipped. A more fundamental criticism incurred by Win-
dows is that placing an ostensibly modern operating envi-
ronment on top of the venerable DOS operating system 44
distracts from the powerful and integrated operating sys-
tems (OS) of the future.45 What has become clear is that
some type of Windows-like desktop metaphor 46 will domi-
nate the present and next generations of personal com-
puters and workstations.
In one package Windows 3.x offered the user of an
IBM-compatible PC a colorful and intuitive graphical user
interface, powerful memory management for the newer
generations of micro-processors, and protected mode multi-
tasking. Crucially, perhaps even luckily, the appearance of
Windows 3.0 on the market coincided with the increasing
Software, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at H1. In early 1993, Next announced that it
was leaving the hardware business and would be concentrating on its OS business.
Next is reported to be looking for an alliance with an applications developer. Cate
Corcoran, The "Next Step" for Next is Finding a Software Developer, INFOWORLD,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 6. For a review of the beta of NextStep 3.1, see Quadibur R. Safi,
NextStep Dazzles on Intel-systems, PC WK., Apr. 5, 1993, at 24.
43. This article adopts the computer industry convention of referrifig to
software releases with a wildcard character. Thus, 3.x refers to both versions 3.0 and
3.1.
44. This causes at least two problems. First, DOS, and so most of Windows, is
limited to 16-bit operation. Most modem processors will handle 32-bit traffic.
(Windows 3.1 has 32-bit disk access and the WFW 3.11 beta sported a 32-bit file
system. Stuart J. Johnston, VFW Upgrade Adds 32-bit File System, INFOWORLD,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 99). Second, although Windows 3.x is a multi-tasking environment,
it lacks the pre-emptive multi-tasking of a multi-threaded OS like NT.
45. See, e.g., John C. Dvorak, Windows, The Mac And DOS, PC MAG., Jan. 29,
1991, at 81; Bill Machrone, Welcome to Windows; Bring Your Checkbook, PC MAG.,
Feb. 12, 1991, at 75; William F. Zachmann, Windows, Now And Forever?, PC MAG.,
May 28, 1991, at 95.
46. Current computer interface design favors a desktop metaphor, in which the
screen is viewed as an electronic desktop upon which various tasks may be viewed in
various stages of completeness. See QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICTIONARY, 180 (3d
ed. 1992) ("a computer representation of your day-to-day work, as if you were look-
ing at an actual desk littered with folders full of work to do").
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availability of relatively inexpensive 386-based PCs, 47 dra-
matically declining memory chip prices, and industry stand-
ardization around color VGA displays.
With Windows 3.x, Microsoft went far beyond prior
versions. It took an improved Windows 2.03 interface and
mated it to memory and processing managers that took ad-
vantage of the 386 microprocessor, including true multi-
tasking, access to virtual memory, and protected mode
processing for multiple DOS sessions. Microsoft's competi-
tors, particularly Apple, and some of its apparent allies
were less than enthused by the success of Windows.
The discrete legal dispute between these two highly
successful founding members of the personal computer
revolution concerned Apple's allegation that Microsoft
Windows violates the former's copyrights in the Lisa and
Macintosh visual displays, principally their windowing abili-
ties.48 However, the litigation must also be viewed in the
context of various sub-texts taking place contemporane-
ously, not all of which directly affected Apple but clearly
implicated Microsoft.
47. The first 386-based machines were shipped by Compaq in 1986. Jonathan
Weber, A Little Computer With Big Impact, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at D1. How-
ever, it was another 2 years before the 386 machine became the business standard,
and it was not until the introduction of lower-priced 386SX machines that smaller
businesses and the home market were taken with the machine.
48. This in itself was not without inconsiderable consequences. Apple originally
claimed $4.37 billion in damages, $3.02 billion for lost profit regarding the interface,
$1.35 billion relating to application programs. Apple Seeking $4.37 billion from
Microsoft, UPI, Feb. 11, 1992. Subsequently, Apple increased that estimate to $5.5
billion, $3.12 billion for lost Macintosh sales, and $2.43 billion for Microsoft's Win-
dows and Windows applications profit. NEWSBYTE NEWS NETWORK, Mar. 20, 1992.
One unsubstantiated rumor is that Apple rejected a $500 million settlement. Laura
Ramsay, Apple's Lawsuit Trying to Close Microsoft's Windows, FINANCIAL POST,
Mar. 9, 1992, at S21.
The original suit called for impoundment and destruction of copyright violating
works. 0. Casey Corr, Apple May Broaden Microsoft Lawsuit, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1991, at B1. Because of the likelihood that Apple also would demand
changes in the Windows interface, Microsoft was believed to have made some con-
tingency design plans. Beth Friedman, Microsoft Considers Options in Look-and-
Feel Lawsuit, PC WK., Feb. 17, 1992, at 120. In a 1992 interview Bill Gates referred
to $10 million in cost, presumably the legal cost associated with the defense of the
Apple suit. Rich Karlgaard, Interview, Bill Gates, FORBES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 63.
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First, Windows 3.x is not just a discrete product, but
also the lynch-pin of Microsoft's broad post-DOS49 strat-
egy. Windows 3.1 and its peer-to-peer sibling Windows for
Workgroups 3.1 and 3.11 will be replaced by a single prod-
uct, Windows 4.0, codenamed "Chicago," in late 1994.50
Positioned above the single desktop/peer-to-peer 4.0, but
still displaying the Windows-family GUI is the cross-plat-
form, heavy duty, developer-oriented, client-server Win-
dows NT51  and its successor, codenamed "Cairo. 52
Positioned "below" Windows 4.0 will be "modular Win-
dows" for consumer products, such as microwave ovens,
cable television boxes, 53 as well as VCRs, and office ma-
chines, such as photocopiers.5 4  "Modular windows" will
run a scaled back version of Windows 3.x. 55
49. DOS 6.0 shipped in early Spring, 1993. A maintenance release, dubbed 6.2
is due in Fall 1993. DOS 7.0 which has been jointly developed with Windows 4.0
(joint codename "Chicago") will ship in late 1994. Some aspects of Chicago may
ship in the late 1993 version of WFW. Amy Cortese, WFW Beta Blazes Trail to
Chicago, PC WK., June 7, 1993, at 8.
50. Windows 4.0 ("Chicago") will be a stand-alone OS with 32-bit code support
which will not require DOS. Stuart J. Johnson, Blueprint for Windows 4 leaves DOS
in the Dust, INFOWORLD, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1; see also Chicago Nears Beta Testing,
PC WK., Aug. 30, 1993, at 1; see, e.g., Eamonn Sullivan & Larry J. Seltzer, Chicago
Beta Radically New, PC WK., Sept. 13, 1993, at 12.
51. Windows NT, which is derived from what Microsoft/IBM OS/2 3.x would
have been, comes in two versions, server ("NT Advanced Server") and desktop.
Robb Car, NT Networking, INoWoRLD, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1. NT shipped in Sum-
mer 1993.
The kernel of NT, the New Technology Operating System or NTOS, will run on
different hardware platforms (e.g., UNIX workstations and PCs) and support differ-
ent user interfaces (e.g., either the Windows or the Presentation Manager Applica-
tion Program Interface (API)). Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, § 3, at 7; Bill Machrone, The Emperor's New Operating System,
PC MAO., May 28, 1991, at 75. Reportedly, Apple is working on a similar project.
Andrew Pollack, Apple May Widen Sales of Operating Systems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1991, at D2.
52. This more object-oriented development of NT will follow in 1994/1995. See,
e.g., Microsoft Pushes Cairo Pace, PC WK., Sept. 27, 1993, at 8.
53. In April, 1993 Microsoft, Intel, and General Instrument signed an agree-
ment to produce "intelligent" cable boxes, the first versions to use the Intel 386
microprocessor and a scaled back version of Windows. John Markoff, Battle Looms
for Control of TV's Portal to Cable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, § 1, at 43.
54. See, e.g., Steve Lohn, Software Giant Aiming at the Office, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 1993, at Dl.
55. Microsoft has also introduced a telephone API. Windows to Swallow
Phones, INFOWORLD, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1. Application programming interfaces are
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The glue holding together this horizontally and verti-
cally expanding family of operating systems is the Windows
interface.56 As the IBM-Microsoft alliance broke down,
leading to both parties developing separate, albeit partially
cross-licensed, 32-bit, multi-threaded OS projects, 7
Microsoft's dominance of the OS market ceased to appear
quite so absolute. IBM quickly joined Apple in creating the
Taligent partnership to produce an object-oriented OS,
sometimes referred to as "Pink. '58 In 1991, Novell acquired
Digital Research, Inc.,59 and in 1993, it purchased Unix Sys-
tem Labs from AT&T.6° It was crucial to Microsoft that
Windows 3.1 should both maintain the OS market until its
new products like NT and Chicago were ready, and provide
a clear migration path to those advanced systems for users
and developers. Any legally induced pause in the develop-
subroutine calling conventions. See WOODY LEONHARD, WINDOWS 3.1 PROGRAM-
MING FOR MERE MORTALS 21 (1992).
56. Both Chicago and Cairo will have revamped interfaces. See, e.g., Eamonn
Sullivan & Larry J. Seltzer, Chicago Beta Radically New, PC WK., Sept. 13, 1993, at
12.
57. OS/2 1.x was jointly developed. OS/2 2.x which began as a joint develop-
ment became an IBM exclusive product. What would have been OS/2 3.x became
Microsoft NT.
58. See, e.g., Ed Scannell, But Will It Have Any Impact, INFOWORLD, Oct. 21,
1991, at 48.
There was speculation at the time of the announcement of Taligent that IBM
was partly motivated by the thought that Apple might win the copyright suit and
strand IBM-compatible users and OS developers without rights to a graphical inter-
face. See Lawrence Curran, A Big Blue Hue for Apple, ELECTRONIcs, Aug., 1991, at
27; see also Evelyn Richards, Apple Chairman Upbeat on Long-Term IBM Deal,
THE WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1991, at D1.
As Microsoft views Windows as a migration path to Windows NT and its future
object-oriented OS (codename Cairo), so IBM is trying to position OS/2 as a migra-
tion path to Taligent. For example, in March 1993 IBM announced that the Taligent
interface will work on top of the OS/2 kernel. There are reports that Apple is also
working on a revision of its System 7 OS (codename Jedi) which can be ported to
other systems including Windows. Amy Cortese, Apple Companion to Propel Cov-
eted Macintosh Features into Mainstream, PC WK., Apr. 26, 1993, at 1.
59. Digital Research, Inc. is the manufacturer of DR. DOS. See infra note 68.
Revised versions of DR. DOS, entitled "Novell DOS" and "NetWare DOS" are due
to be released by Novell in the fall of 1993. PC MAO., Apr. 13, 1993, at 124. For
enthusiastic advance reviews see The Next Generation Publisher, PC WORLD, Oct.,
1993, at 89; PC WK., Oct. 4, 1993, at 1.
60. See, e.g., Jim Seymour, Novell and UNIX: A Good Fit, PC MAO., Mar. 30,
1993, at 99.
ment of the Windows line of OS products would seriously
damage and possibly destroy Microsoft's strategy.6'
Second, DOS application software is individualized,
even quirky, with different application developers stressing
very different aspects of a very plain interface. For exam-
ple, WordPerfect for DOS makes extremely heavy use of
function keys, whereas Lotus 1-2-3 for DOS uses the slash
key to access layers of menus. In contrast, a graphical inter-
face with an agreed metaphor such as the Macintosh, Win-
dows, or the Windows-derived Presentation Manager in
OS/2, both invites and requires considerable standardiza-
tion.62 DOS may have been the almost universal choice as
an OS and highly profitable for Microsoft, but it played a
relatively minor role in setting standards for application
software. In contrast, whichever company ends up control-
ling the interface of the next major OS would have just that
influence. It might be what is called an open standard, but
it would be centrally influenced by the OS developer. 63
Third, in enterprise computing environments the use of
mainframe computers has persistently declined; the main-
frames are being replaced by networks of mini-computers,
workstations, or PCs. The major software developers are
engaged in a battle for the control of networking and, a for-
61. In a 1991 memo, Microsoft chairman Bill Gates was reported to have
warned that the loss of the suit could be "disastrous." Jane Morrissey, "Look-and-
Feel" Suit by Apple Misses Mark Against Microsoft, PC WK., Apr. 27, 1992, at 137.
62. At a simple level this explains the CUA keyboard assignments used in Win-
dows (e.g., Alt+F,X always closes an application). At a more complex level, the OS
designer has considerable influence on driver design and behavior, and APIs appli-
cation programming interfaces).
63. Control of an "open standard" may have been the motivation for the
Novell acquisition of UNIX Labs. See supra note 60. Following the mid-1993 re-
lease of Windows NT, Novell responded with a proposal to make UNIX truly open
by providing it free to X/Open Inc., an industry consortium based in London, Eng-
land. Novell Seen to Open UNIX, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at D6. Subsequently,
some of the major UNIX developers balked at adopting Novell's Unixware as the
UNIX standard. PC WK., Sept. 27, 1993, at 1; see, e.g., Lawrence M. Fisher, New
Crusader in Software's Holy War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, § 3, at 7. However, after
a delay the rights were transferred. Lawrence M. Fisher, Novell to Let Industry
Group Have UNIX Software Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at D4.
Some question whether Microsoft may be more interested in a "closed system"
such that applications developers would have to pay a license fee for their products
to run on Windows. See John C. Dvorak, Will Windows Turn Proprietary?, PC
MAG., Aug., 1993, at 93.
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tiori, network operating systems.64 Analysts have long con-
sidered the lack of a successful networking product to be
the major weakness in Microsoft's product line.65 In con-
trast, Apple's Macintosh computers have had networking
capabilities built in for some time, and, with the deteriora-
tion of its relationship with IBM, Microsoft lost its most
network-aware partner. Microsoft's networking strategy is
linked inextricably with its Windows strategy, Windows for
Workgroups for small and peer-to-peer networks, NT for
larger client-server systems. Losing the Windows edge, both
as a migration path and from the perspective of interface
design, would not -only shift networking momentum from
Microsoft back to Apple, but also empower further Novell,
the dominant network developer.66
Fourth, the Windows case was not Microsoft's only
legal worry in the early 1990s. Microsoft has been the fre-
quent target of accusations from other software manufac-
turers regarding some of its trade practices.67 Coincident
with the Apple litigation striking at Windows, Microsoft's
64. There are three broad groups of networks: peer-to-peer, local area net-
works (LANs), and wide area networks (WANs). For a comparison of the major
networking systems, see Frederic Paul, AppleTalk Router First to Debut with AURP
Support, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 18, 1993, at 21.
65. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, One Day Junior Got Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1991, § 3, at 1.
66. Novell shipped Netware 4.0 in April, 1993. Peter H. Lewis, The Executive
Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, § 3, at 8. Novell and Microsoft crossed
swords in late 1992 over allegedly unauthorized use of Novell's IPX code in Win-
dows for Workgroups. Paul Andrews, High Technology - Microsoft, Novell Quar-
rel Over License, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992, at Fl. WFW competes in the same
market as Novell's Netware Lite. Novell is widely reported to be Microsoft's litiga-
tion nemesis, and hired two Washington law firms (Ablondi & Foster and Arnold &
Porter) to state its antitrust allegations. Wendy Goldman, Novell Hires 2nd Law
Firm for FTC-Microsoft Case, PC WK., June 21, 1993, at 10. At Microsoft's annual
financial analysts meeting in July, 1993, Microsoft chairman Bill Gates described
Novell's involvement as "an increasingly paranoid political attack." Amy Cortese &
Jane Morrissey, Gates Blasts Novell "Vendetta," PC WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 10.
67. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, One Day Junior Got Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1991, § 3, at 1. According to the book "Computer Wars," by Charles Ferguson
and Charles Morris, Bill Gates "is the most hated man in the computer industry."
For portraits of Gates see Fred Moody, Mr. Software, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, § 6,
at 26; Kathleen K. Wiegner & Julie Potta, Can Anyone Stop Bill Gates, FORBES,
Apr. 1, 1991; Kathy Rebello, Bill Gates' Baby is on Top of the World. Can it Stay
There?, BusINESS WK., Feb. 24, 1992, at 60; Rich Karlgaard, Interview, Bill Gates,
FORBES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 63.
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core product, the Federal Trade Commission announced an
inquiry into Microsoft's business practices,68 and antitrust
allegations are now the subject of Justice Department69 and
DG-IV investigations. 0
Unsubstantiated allegations against Microsoft include patent infringement (see,
e.g., the patent infringement action brought by Stac Electronics over the disk com-
pression features in DOS 6.0. AP, Jan. 26, 1993. Microsoft countered with an alle-
gation that Stac's patent was invalid. PC WK., Mar. 8, 1993, at 6.) and stealing ideas
in the course of considering collaboration. See, e.g., 0. Casey Corr, Hi-tech-
Microsoft Plays Hardball - Some Question Its Growing Dominance, SEATrLE TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1991, at B1; Kathy Rebello, Is Microsoft Too Powerful, BUSINESS WK., Mar.
1, 1993, at 82.
68. See, e.g., Microsoft: Predator or Tough Rival?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 28, 1992, at 1; Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft in Inquiry by FTC, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1991, at D1; Andrew Pollack, Microsoft's Tactics Questioned by Rivals, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at D1; Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft Says FTC has Expanded
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, § 1, at 39. Although, initially, an apparently
wide-ranging investigation, this FTC probe was soon narrowed down to concerns
over the original IBM-Microsoft agreement regarding DOS and Microsoft's licens-
ing practices with regard to DOS. Microsoft is the overwhelmingly dominant sup-
plier of the basic PC OS. Its only competitor is DR DOS, a product which has long
been considered technically or feature superior. See Winn L. Rosch, DR Dos 5.0;
The Better Operating System?, PC MAG., Feb. 12, 1991, at 241. DR DOS was devel-
oped by Digital Research, Inc., which was acquired by Novell in the summer of 1991.
See Jane Morrissey & Paul M. Sherer, Novell to Buy DRI in Bid for OS Claim;
Competition in Operating System Market Includes Related Article on Novell Inc.,
Digital Research Inc. Merger, PC WK., July 22, 1991, at 1 (DR DOS 5.0 compared to
DOS 4.01); Stan Miastkowski, Digital Research Creates a Better DOS, BYTE, Nov.,
1991, at 68 (DR DOS 6.0 compared to DOS 5.0). The FTC's investigator's theory
was that Microsoft's licensing practices for the distribution of DOS by computer
manufacturers (per processor pricing) effectively precluded competition. See, e.g.,
Kathy Rebello, Is Microsoft too Powerful?, BUSINESS WK., Mar. 1, 1993, at 82. It
was rumored that the FTC would move for an immediate injunction against
Microsoft in its meeting of February 5, 1993. However, the FTC commissioners
reached a 2-2 impasse. See Tie Vote Blocks Move to Enjoin Microsoft Sales Prac-
tices, FTC: WATCH No. 383, Feb. 8, 1993.
Additional allegations of unfair trade practices against Microsoft have included
using knowledge of upcoming OS functions to give its applications a jump on the
competition and using undocumented calls in its OS to benefit its applications pro-
grams. See Thomas McCarroll, IBM's Unruly Kids, TIME, Feb. 1, 1993, at 54; see,
e.g., ANDREW SCHULMAN, ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED WINDOWS (1992). See also 0.
Casey Carr, Hi-tech - Microsoft Plays Hardball - Some Question Its Growing In-
dustry Dominance, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991, at B1.
69. After the 38-month FTC investigation stalled, the Justice Department's An-
titrust Division announced its own inquiry. See, e.g., John Markoff, Microsoft Con-
fronts its Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at Cl.
70. The European Community's antitrust authority (Directorate-General IV) is
said to be probing Microsoft's business practices as a result of a complaint by Novell.
Suzanne Perry-Reuter, Microsoft Faces Probe in Europe, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1993,
at El.
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Finally, successive developments of Intel and Intel-
clone micro-processors such as the faster 486s and Pentiums
provided IBM-compatibles with considerably more com-
puting power than their Macintosh or Macintosh-derived ri-
vals. If Windows was allowed to succeed, Macintosh
application software developers would "port" their success-
ful desktop publishing and graphics manipulation products
to Windows, threatening to overwhelm Apple's traditional
advantages.
Each of these legal, commercial, and technological is-
sues was and is dramatically important for the future of PC
computing and key to the continued dominant influence of
Microsoft. The concurrent Windows litigation served to
raise the stakes for each of them.
III. AN INTRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law protects computer software in much the
same way as it extends to other forms of expression.71
Copyright infringement is established when the plaintiff
proves existence, ownership, and validity of the copyright,
as well as copying by the defendant. 2 In the absence of
direct evidence, copying may be established with circum-
stantial evidence. Typically, this situation will involve prov-
ing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's
copyrighted work73 and showing a "substantial similarity"
between the two works.74
The defendant bears the burden of proving the invalid-
ity of a registered copyright.75 A copyright is not valid if it
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1993). For an excellent primer on copyright protection of
computer software see Gates Rubber Co. v. Bardo Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d
823, 831-46 (10th Cir. 1993).
72. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); see also NIMMER, supra
note 14, at 1.03[3].
73. For example, buying the copyrighted work. See Spectravest, Inc. v.
Mervyn's, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486, 1491 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
74. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1162.
75. See, e.g., Tonka Corp. v. Tsaisun, Inc., No. Civ. 3-85-1885, 1986 WL 29980,
at *2 (D. Minn. 1986); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357,
363 (D. Del. 1980).
Copyright registration is not a prerequisite to copyright protection, 17 U.S.C.
§ 408, which inures to the author at the moment the work is created. 17 U.S.C.
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lacks an element of originality. However, the requirement
of originality should not be overstated. According to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
Although the originality concept defies exact definition,
courts generally agree that "originality" for copyright
purposes is something less than the novelty or unique-
ness necessary for patent protection. The test of origi-
nality variously has been characterized as "modest,""minimal," and "a low threshold" . . . . All that is
needed.., is that the "author" contributed more than a"merely trivial" variation, something recognizably "his
own." Originality in this context "means little more
than a prohibition of actual copying." No matter how
poor artistically the "author's" addition, it is enough if it
be his own.7 6
The presumption of originality provided by registration
may be rebutted with evidence that the copyrighted work
itself was copied from another work.77
Other than originality, there are other requirements
for copyrightability or protectibility. For example, copy-
right protection is not extended to ideas, only the expres-
sion of ideas.78 In cases where the idea and the expression
of the idea are inseparable, the so-called merger doctrine
applies to deny protection in the absence of duplication.79
Similarly, if the number of ways to express an idea is ex-
§ 102(a). However, to protect her copyright, an author must attach a copyright no-
tice. 17 U.S.C. § 401. Registration operates as a prerequisite to some crucial aspects
of an infringement suit. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 411(a), 412; Bull HN Information
Systems, Inc. v. American Express Bank Ltd., No. 88 (CIV. 2103 SWK), 1990 WL
48098 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (no infringement action absent valid registration). See, e.g.,
NIMMER, supra note 14, at 1.20-.22.
76. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821, 824 (11th
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 825.
78. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." In other words, copy-
ing only extends to "copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea
itself." Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
79. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., Inc., 509 F.2d 64,
65 (2d Cir. 1974).
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tremely limited, the expression will not be copyrightable 8°,
because that would confer a monopoly of the idea on the
copyright owner.81 For the same reason, scenes A faire
(stock or practically indispensable items) are given very lit-
tle protection.82
In computer software cases the idea-expression dichot..
omy and other aspects of unprotectibility have become
hopelessly intermingled with the "substantial similarity" in-
quiry.83 Into this confusion has stepped "look and feel, 84
at which point two different principles have served to fur-
ther obfuscate the issue. First, it seems correct that copy-
right protection may extend to non-literal aspects, 5 or the
"total concept and feel" of a work. Second,
"[c]opyrightable expression may be found in the arrange-
ment of elements that individually are not subject to copy-
right protection. ' 86 The key to this apparent dichotomy is
that, where the plaintiff is arguing protection of the "total
concept and feel" yet the discrete elements that make up
80. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967):
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic
necessarily requires" if not only one form of expression, at best only a lim-
ited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by
copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of fu-
ture use of the substance. In such circumstances it does not seem accurate
to say that any particular form of expression comes from the subject mat-
ter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter would be appro-
priated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot
recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be
checkmated.
81. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 509 F.2d at 65.
82. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1159 (1986). See also American Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Azad Int'l, Inc., 783 F. Supp.
84, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Material or themes commonly repeated in a certain genre
are not protectible by copyright").
83. See infra text accompanying note 233.
84. Cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D.
Mass. 1990). See infra text accompanying note 213.
85. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest,
Inc., 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). See infra note 239.
86. Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., No. 89 CIV 2440 LLS, 1990 WL 74540, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
that gestalt are not individually copyrightable, then only
verbatim (virtually identical or literal) copying is barred.8 7
As will be seen, it is arguable that in the Windows litigation,
Apple in effect was advocating a substantial similarity ap-
proach to protecting its interface, notwithstanding that it
was composed of unprotectible elements.
Although there is broad acceptance of these principles
of copyright law, different circuits have evolved very differ-
ent practical approaches.88 For example, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, which will hear any appeal of
the Windows case, has developed a bifurcated test for "sub-
stantial similarity" involving both extrinsic and intrinsic
stages. 89 The Ninth Circuit also has endorsed the technique
of what is known as "analytic dissection" in determining
copyrightability.
Importantly, in the context of the Windows litigation,
analytic dissection is appropriate for the first, extrinsic part
of the test, and it often may be a judge-made determina-
tion. Indeed, dissection may be performed to determine
whether similarities result from unprotectible expression. 9°
According to the Ninth Circuit, however, dissection is inap-
propriate when it comes to the intrinsic stage which will
typically be a jury-made decision.91 That second stage "does
not depend on some hypercritical scrutiny of the works. It
depends on the response of the ordinary reasonable
person. ,92
It bears reiterating that, while substantial similarity is
the basic test for copying under both parts of the bifurcated
test, near or virtual identity is required in cases where there
87. See, e.g., Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1507 (9th Cir.
1987).
88. See, e.g., Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476,
1490 n.17 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
89. See infra text accompanying note 269.
90. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988); Aliotti
v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Telemarketing Re-
sources v. Symantec Corp., No. C88-20352-RPA, 1989 WL 200350, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
91. Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 900.
92. JBJ Fabrics, Inc. v. Mark Indus., Inc., No. CV 86-4881 FFF, 1987 WL 47381,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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is a merger of the idea and its expression. 93 Near or virtual
identity is also required where there are only a limited
number of ways to express the idea 94 as in all cases of
unprotectibility.
Finally, modern copyright law must be interpreted in
the light of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Com-
pany, Inc.9 5 Feist concerned a claim of copyright infringe-
ment involving telephone white pages. The issue revolved
around the disparate treatment copyright law affords to
facts and factual compilations.96 However, in the course of
the Court's opinion, Justice O'Connor made several gener-
alized statements about the role and doctrine of copyright
law that may influence the determination of computer
software and, a fortiori interface cases. For example, the
Justice stressed the requirement of creativity with the state-
ment, "[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only
those constituent elements of a work that possess more
than a de minimis quantum of creativity .... [C]opyright
rewards originality, not effort." 97
[T]he 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no
doubt that originality, not "sweat of the brow," is the
touchstone of copyright protection in directories and
other fact-based works .... The revisions explain with
painstaking clarity that copyright requires originality;
that facts are never original; that the copyright in a com-
pilation does not extend to the facts it contains; and that
93. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 65
(2d Cir. 1974); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977) ("When idea and expression coincide,
there will be protection against nothing other than identical copying of the work").
94. See, e.g., Frybarger v. International Business Mach., Inc., 812 F.2d 525, 529-
30 (9th Cir. 1987).
95. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the court
which was joined by seven justices. Justice Blackmun concurred without opinion.
96. Id. at 1287-90. The court resolved that tension as follows:
Copyright treats facts and factual compilations in a wholly consistent man-
ner. Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and
therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for
copyright if it features an original selection or arrangement of facts, but the
copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrangement. In no event
may copyright extend to the facts themselves.
Id. at 1290.
97. Id. at 1297.
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a compilation is copyrightable only to the extent that it
features- an original selection, coordination, or
arrangement.98
The Feist court's observations on mere compilations must
be considered by any software developer seeking to synthe-
size existing aspects of an interface.
IV. LITIGATING THE WINDOWS INTERFACE
In March 1988, Apple Corporation filed suit against
Microsoft Corporation and Hewlett-Packard claiming that
Microsoft's Windows version 2.03 and Hewlett-Packard's
New Wave" environments infringed Apple's copyrights on
the presentation and control of screen information. 1°° Spe-
cifically, Apple maintained that there were 189 "similarities
in particular features" between the Macintosh display and
Windows. 101 In essence, however, Apple was claiming that
Microsoft had appropriated the "look and feel" of the
Macintosh.
A. The Impact of the 1985 License Agreement
A week after suit was filed Apple and Microsoft made
public their previously secret 1985 agreement. 10 2 By that
98. Id. at 1295 (citations omitted).
99. Microsoft apparently granted a license to Hewlett-Packard to use Windows
technology in developing New Wave. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759
F. Supp. 1444, 1447-48 (N.D. Cal. 1991). As Windows "sits" upon DOS, so New
Wave sits upon Windows. For a description of New Wave version 3.0, see Peter H.
Lewis, A Program That Harnesses Other Software's Strengths, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 17,
1990, § 3, at 8. New Wave makes Windows more object-oriented. However, it has
been perceived as little more than a Windows accessory, and outgunned by utilities
such as Symantec Corporation's Norton Desktop for Windows. New Wave's future
is uncertain given the rumors of a much more object-oriented Windows 4.0 ("Chi-
cago") due for release in 1994. By Spring, 1993, New Wave was in version 4.1.
100. Andrew Pollack, Apple Sues Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1988, at D3. Specifically, Apple alleged three claims: (1) copyright infringe-
ment by Windows 2.03 and New Wave, (2) contributory infringement against
Microsoft for licensing the visual displays to Hewlett-Packard, and (3) unfair compe-
tition. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal.
1991). At issue were seven Apple copyrights. See Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
101. 759 F. Supp. at 1448.
102. Reportedly, the 1985 agreement followed a threat by Microsoft to stop de-
veloping products for the Macintosh. Andrew Pollack, Microsoft's Tactics Ques-
tioned by Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at D1 (referring to Apple chairman
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agreement, and in return for acknowledging the Macintosh
derivation of the Windows visual display, Apple had
granted Microsoft a perpetual and royalty free non-exclu-
sive license "to use these derivative works in present and
future software programs. "103 In return, Microsoft granted
Apple a more limited cross-license on the displays it had
created for Windows, and it agreed to develop business
software for the Macintosh. 1' 4
Microsoft's key initial contention was that the agree-
ment was a complete defense; a license to use Apple's tech-
nology to develop future versions of Windows as it
pleased.10 5 Apple countered that the license was limited to
Windows version 1.0, and Windows 2.03 violated its copy-
right. Microsoft filed a countersuit alleging that Apple had
breached the 1985 agreement and had interfered with
Microsoft's relationship with other software developers.1°'5
John Sculley's book ODYSSEY). In a later interview Bill Gates recalled the issue as
follows:
An Apple lawyer named Jack Brown went up to Microsoft and said some
things about whether intellectual property rights were being used the right
way. This was before we shipped Windows 1.0. Then I came down and saw
John [Sculley]. Apple licensed us some rights, and we reaffirmed our com-
mitment to do certain things for the Macintosh.
John Markoff, Armistice For Apple and Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1992, at D1.
103. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
104. Id. A summary of the agreement appears at Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fisher,
Apple and Microsoft Disclose a 1985 Pact, N.Y. TIrEs, Mar. 24, 1988, at D5.
105. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Apple Wins Round in Microsoft Suit, N.Y. TirMs,
Mar. 18, 1989, § 1, at 35; Microsoft Copyright Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1989, at
D7; Peter H. Lewis, All's Not Quiet on the Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1989,
§ 3, at 8.
106. Apple Accused by Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1988, at D4. Ironically,
the continuing battle between Microsoft and Apple in the "interface war," did not
stop them from forming an alliance in the so-called "font wars." In an agreement
announced in October 1989, Microsoft and Apple cross-swapped "True'lype" scala-
ble font technology (Apple's) and "Trueimage" font printer driver technology
(Microsoft's). See Peter H. Lewis, The Fallout From the Font Wars, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1989, § 3, at 13; The Microsoft-Apple Standard-Bearer in the Font Wars, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at C6. The other major combatant in the font wars is IBM
which has an agreement with Adobe to use the latter's display and printer interfaces.
Andrew Pollack, I.B.M. Will Use Adobe's Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1990, at
D24; Peter H. Lewis, The Font Wars: New Weapons are Rolled Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1990, § 3, at 8. For the apparent peace treaty, see Peter H. Lewis, On the
Font Battlefront, An Uneasy Truce Raises Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1990, § 3, at 8;
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However, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
Judge Schwarzer ruled that only the visual displays in Win-
dows 1.0 were the subject matter of the license. 107 In con-
cluding that the programs were significantly different,0 8 the
court based its decision on the fact that Windows 2.03, the
subject of the action, used overlapping windows whereas
Windows 1.0, the specific subject of the license, used tiled
windows.' °9 Given these determinations, it followed that
the license could not constitute a complete defense with re-
gard to Windows 2.03 attributes not present in Windows
1.0.
Subsequently, the court dealt with the question
whether the 1985 agreement constituted a partial defense to
the infringement claim,"10 and concluded that the license
did cover discrete aspects of the Windows 2.03 display that
were found in Windows 1.0."' While Apple claimed that
there were 189 "similarities in particular features" between
the Macintosh display and the defendants' products,"12
Microsoft argued that 178"13 of those features were in-
see, e.g., Edward Mendelson, Typefaces Unlimited: 5 Font Managers for Windows
3.0, PC MAG., Apr. 16, 1991, at 167-201; see also Paul Andrews, Microsoft, Apple
Clear the Air, SEATrLE Tn mEs, July 15, 1992, at B4 (joint Apple-Microsoft news con-
ference on product plans).
107. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 928-30 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
108. Id. at 930-31.
109. Windows 3.0 can display either cascading or tiled windows. MICRosoFr
WINDOWS USER'S GUIDE 84-85 (Microsoft 1990).
110. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
111. Id. at 1430-32. Specifically, the court concluded:
In its prior ruling the Court concluded that overlapping windows, as fea-
tured in Windows 2.03, are a visual display within the meaning of the 1985
Agreement and are not within the scope of the license. But overlapping
windows, obviously, are not the only visual display in Windows 2.03. And
equally obviously, because Windows 1.0 did not have overlapping windows,
it must have had other visual displays or else the license would have been
an empty gesture. It must be concluded therefore that the Agreement
licenses the use of the visual displays in Windows 1.0 and to that extent
provides a partial defense to infringement claims based on the use of such
visual displays.
Id. at 1432 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 1433.
113. In its ruling of August 1992, the court summarized this previous motion and
determination as involving 179 items covered by the license. Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (1992). Apple alleged 147 similarities
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cluded in Windows 1.0.114 The court's preliminary conclu-
sion was as follows: "This review discloses that both
Windows 1.0 and Windows 2.03 have many visual displays
that are also found in the Macintosh user interface. It also
discloses, however, that most visual displays in Windows
2.03 are also in Windows 1.0 and, therefore, are covered by
the 1985 license. 115
The court proceeded to allocate the features identified
by Apple to one of six categories: the appearance of indi-
vidual main application windows; the design and appear-
ance of dialogue boxes; the design and appearance of
menus; the design and appearance of applications pro-
grams; icon design, appearance and manipulation, and the
representation of multiple main application windows. 116 Of
these features, the court ruled that the visual displays em-
ployed in Windows 2.03 were essentially the same as those
employed in version 1.0 except for the use of overlapping,
rather than application windows, and some changes in the
appearance, location, and use of icons. 17
Microsoft next argued that the overlapping windows
features which were not present in Windows 1.0118 never-
theless were covered by the 1985 agreement because they
were featured in the displays of the application programs
also covered by the agreement." 9 The court accepted Ap-
ple's argument that the only application program visual dis-
plays covered by the agreement were those generated by
with New Wave, of which all but 54 were found by the court to be covered by the
license. Id.
114. 717 F. Supp. at 1433.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1433-34.
117. Id. at 1434-35. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fisher, Ruling Favors Microsoft and
Hewlett, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1989, § 1, at 31; Microsoft Case Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 1989, at D3.
118. Identified in the case as items Al, A8, B1, B2, D1, D2, and D3, the list
included such classic windowing features as the top window in an overlapping stack
being displayed as active (B1), a window being moved to the top of a stack when
clicked (B2), and dragging windows (D1). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
119. Apple had argued that five Microsoft applications programs developed for
the Macintosh, including Word and Excel, infringed its copyrights. Thus, the 1985
agreement was worded to include not only the visual displays in Windows 1.0 but
also those in the application programs.
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the application programs themselves. Since the visual dis-
plays in dispute were generated not by the applications but
as a result of calls made to the Macintosh operating system,
the resulting displays were not covered by the agreement.12°
At a later stage, Apple moved to have the license
struck down on the basis of fraud and coercion, possibly
because it was aware that the way the license agreement's
dissection of the Macintosh interface was adversely affect-
ing its case. 2  On that point, the court ruled against
Apple.122
B. Protectibility and Infringement
With the 1985 agreement failing to provide a total de-
fense, the dominant question in the Windows litigation be-
came whether the remaining visual display features not
covered by the license infringed Apple's copyrights. That
question involved the frequently overlapping issues of pro-
tectibility (or validity) and substantial similarity.123 In its
March 1991 ruling the court dealt with two issues regarding
the protectibility of Apple's copyrights.
First, Hewlett-Packard challenged the validity of the
registered copyrights on the basis of fraud on the copyright
office; specifically, Apple's failure to disclose the intellec-
tual debt owed to the Xerox-developed interfaces of the
1970s. 24 Judge Walker, 25 who by now had taken over the
120. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal.
1991). What Microsoft received in the 1985 Agreement was the right to continue to
market its application programs written for the Macintosh and to use the visual dis-
plays generated by those application programs (not the visual displays generated by
calls by the application programs to the Macintosh operating system) in present and
future programs.
121. AP, June 13, 1991.
122. Judge Walker described Apple's argument as a "sideshow," characterizing
Apple's late discovery of the issue as "pretty outlandish." AP, June 13, 1991.
123. Microsoft's affirmative defenses include challenges to the validity of the
Apple copyrights on the basis that the visual displays were merely functional, not
original and were common and ordinary expressions of unprotectible ideas. 759 F.
Supp. at 1453 n.12.
124. Id. at 1454. This is similar to the issue which arose in the Ashton-Tate liti-
gation over dBASE, its leading database software. Therein, the trial judge ruled that
the plaintiff had knowingly and with an intent to deceive failed to disclose that its
program was derived from a public domain program developed by the Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, Inc.,
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Windows litigation from Judge Schwarzer, 126 had decided
the earlier case of Xerox Corporation v. Apple Computer,
Inc. 127 In Xerox the plaintiffs' application for a declaration
that the Macintosh interface was derived from the copy-
righted Star had failed.128 Judge Walker's view of the Win-
dows case was consistent with that opinion, and he granted
Apple's motion for partial summary judgment against Hew-
lett-Packard which had failed to establish a triable issue on
the invalidity of Apple's copyrights. 129
Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard also attacked the Ap-
ple copyrights on the basis of lack of originality. On this
issue the court reached the following conclusion:
[A]ithough there is evidence that Apple's designers
borrowed ideas from Xerox's Smalltalk and Star pro-
grams, there is no substantiation for the allegation that
Apple copied protectible elements of expression from
those programs. Indeed, photocopies of visual displays
from the Smalltalk and Star programs within the par-
760 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Cal. 1990); see, e.g., Don J. DeBenedictis, Critics Say Judge
Misapplied Patent Law in Dismissing Software Maker's Suit, 77 ABA J. 30 (Mar.
1991); PC WORLD, Apr. 1991, at 68. Subsequently, Ashton-Tate's motion to recon-
sider was decided in Ashton-Tate's favor. 760 F. Supp. at 831. The Ashton-Tate/Fox
litigation was resolved as part of the Justice Department's scrutiny of the acquisition
of Ashton-Tate by Borland. United States v. Borland Int'l, Inc., et al.; Proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 56 Fed. Reg. 56096 (1991); see
also Software Merger Complaint Settled: Royalty Free Licensing Scheme Adopted,
FTC: WATCH No. 353 (October 21, 1991). Shortly thereafter Fox Software, Inc.,
was acquired by Microsoft. Lawrence M. Fisher, Borland to Acquire a Rival, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1991, at D1.
125. For a profile of Judge Walker, see Heather Clancy, Judge Vaughn Richard
Walker, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Oct. 21, 1991, at 166.
126. Judge Schwarzer took a five-year leave of absence from the bench to head
the Federal Judicial Center. Don Clark, Apple Case Gets Another New Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at C1.
127. 734 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1990). See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Most of
Xerox's Suit Against Apple Barred, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 24, 1990, § 1, at 31.
128. Note that Xerox did not allege that Lisa and Macintosh had been copied
from Star. See Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1552 n.17
(N.D. Cal. 1990).
129. Hewlett-Packard had established that Apple was "influenced" by Smalltalk
and Star, but nothing further, and it had failed to offer evidence of the necessary
intent to deceive the copyright office. Hewlett-Packard failed in its allegation that
the visual displays were derivative works in the absence of evidence of substantial




ties' exhibits reveal scant similarity of expression be-
tween Xerox's and Apple's visual displays. 130
At this point in the litigation, Apple appeared to have the
upper hand. Indeed, Apple was clearly on the offensive,
amending its complaint to include Windows 3.0 and chal-
lenging the validity of the 1985 license agreement. 3 1 Less
spectacularly, however, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard
moved for reconsideration of the issue of copyrightability.
In August 1991, in what was the turning point in the
Windows litigation, the court granted the defense motion,
stating that "lack of original expression of a component ele-
ment shall be relevant to the scope of protection and sub-
stantial similarity analyses.' 32 Although he opened the
door to the question of copyrightability, Judge Walker mini-
mized defense expectations by appending his views on the
issue of originality.
If a plaintiff directly copied the expressive elements of
his work from preexisting works, he has no right to pre-
clude others from using those same "unoriginal" ele-
ments. The defendant may not, of course, take any
original expressive elements from plaintiff's work and
use them in a substantially similar manner simply be-
cause plaintiff used "unoriginal" elements and this re-
mains true even if all but one of the expressive elements
of plaintiff's work are unoriginal. The addition of even
one original expressive element may so alter a work
otherwise wholly comprised of unoriginal elements that
copyright protection is appropriate ....
Defendants must show that the component fea-
tures of Apple's works which are allegedly "unoriginal"
have been directly copied from prior works. In other
words, if Apple's expression of those component features
is different from the expression of similar features in pre-
existing programs, then defendants have failed to estab-
lish that Apple's expression is "unoriginal. "'33
130. Id. at 1455. For a less than flattering critique of Judge Walker's ruling, see
William Zachman, Latest Apple Ruling Muddies Already Murky Water, PC WK.,
Mar. 18, 1991, at 66.
131. See supra text accompanying note 121.
132. 779 F. Supp. at 135.
133. Id. at 134-35 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, Judge Walker characterized the defense strat-
egy as seeking "to use lack of originality of constituent ele-
ments as a means of eliminating those elements from the
substantial similarity of expression analysis. ' 134 As a result
Judge Walker offered his thoughts on that very issue of
"dissecting" the Apple interface, a recurring theme in de-
fense motions and arguments. 35  At this stage, Judge
Walker first addressed the dynamically interconnected con-
cepts of dissection, copyrightability (protectibility), and"substantial similarity" (or infringement), as follows:
Some dissection of elements and the application of
merger, functionality, sc6nes 6 faire, and unoriginality
theories are necessary to determine which elements can
be used freely by the public in creating new works, so
long as those works do not incorporate the same selec-
tion or arrangement as that of the plaintiff's work. Be-
cause there ought to be copyright protection for an
innovative melding of elements from preexisting works,
elements which have been deemed "unprotectible"
should not be eliminated prior to the substantial simi-
larity of expression analysis. Suppose defendant copied
plaintiff's abstract painting composed entirely of geo-
metric forms arranged in an original pattern. The al-
leged infringer could argue that each expressive
element (i.e., the geometric forms) is unprotectible
under the functionality, merger, scdnes A faire, and
unoriginality theories and, thus, all elements should be
excluded prior to the substantial similarity of expression
analysis. Then, there would be nothing left for purposes
of determining substantial similarity of expression. In
this example, elimination of "unprotectible" elements
would result in a finding of no copyright infringement,
which would be clearly inconsistent with the copyright
law's purpose of providing incentives to authors of orig-
inal works.
Accordingly, the court concludes that even if ele-
ments are found "unprotectible," they should not be
134. Id. at 134.
135. However, as Judge Walker noted, "[ailthough HP contends that it is not
urging the court to dissect features of Apple's works to such a trivial degree, the
parties offer no comprehensible standard to ascertain how close a dissection is re-
quired to implement the copyright laws." Id. at 135.
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eliminated from the substantial similarity of expression
analysis. Instead, if it is determined that the defendant
used the unprotectible elements in an arrangement
which is not substantially similar to the plaintiff's work,
then no copyright infringement can be found. If, on the
other hand, the works are deemed substantially similar,
then copyright infringement will be established even
though the copyrighted work is composed of unpro-
tectible elements. There is simply no other logical way
of protecting an innovative arrangement or "look and
feel" of certain works.'3 6
Thus, dissection and a determination of unprotectibility of
individual components or features, although dispositive of
infringement claims regarding those discrete features, might
not preclude an overall "substantial similarity" analysis of
the whole interface. 137
Nevertheless, this statement by the judge does hint at
what was becoming the major impediment to Apple's case,
namely an unwillingness to address infringement prior to
addressing copyrightability. Judge Walker structured hear-
ings on defense motions to deal first with copyrightable is-
sues and then similarity issues.13  This action was consistent
with earlier rulings by both Judge Walker and Judge
136. Id. at 134-35.
137. Judge Walker dealt with the "look and feel" issue in much the same way as
Judge Schwarzer who had preceded him.
Implicit in Judge Schwarzer's approach to the case is a rejection of Apple's
fundamental contention that the "total concept and feel" of the Macintosh
graphic user interface is protectible expression. Rather, Judge Schwarzer's
approach appears to have been to exclude licensed visual displays prior to
applying the substantial similarity of idea and expression tests. The under-
signed has considered a different approach to the litigation from that
adopted by Judge Schwarzer, one that would not begin by an attempt to
parse the visual displays of the Macintosh system software. However ap-
pealing such an approach might seem in the abstract, the 1985 Agreement
appears to license individual visual displays rather than an overall "total
concept and feel."
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1991);
Andrew Pollack, Judge Favors Apple Stand on Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991,
at D5. This approach subsequently was restated at Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1992). See, e.g., Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 62-63 (D. Mass. 1990); Ashton-
Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 520-22 (9th Cir. 1990).
138. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (N.D.
Cal. 1992).
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Schwarzer that the question of copyright infringement
would be addressed on a function-by-function basis, not by
reference to the overall "look and feel" of the interfaces.
Apple effectively ignored this structure. As Judge Walker
later related:
Apple refused to join the issues raised in defendants'
motions. Apple contended that its own lists of similari-
ties are not exact descriptions of any infringing features,
but merely examples of the overall similarity of defend-
ants' works. Sticking stubbornly to a "look and feel" or"gestalt" theory of this lawsuit, Apple was apparently of
the belief that these passwords would automatically get
its case around summary judgment motions and to a
jury, regardless whether any of the visual displays that
potentially comprise this "look and feel" are themselves
protectible expression. 139
At this time Judge Walker, who had been less than en-
thralled by the video evidence presented to him, requested
copies of the disputed programs installed on computers to
be made available to the court. Subsequently, the parties
gave the judge and his staff tutorials on the equipment. 4°
Hands-on experience by the court must have been responsi-
ble partially for the far more detailed and technologically
insightful rulings that followed.
Legal and commercial analysis now merged as it be-
came apparent that by concentrating solely on "look and
feel" Apple was seeking to protect the desktop meta-
phor.' 4' It was this approach that led the court to complete,
unopposed, the effective dismemberment of Apple's case
with its rulings of April 14, 1992.142 At that time the ten
remaining features that had been determined as falling
outside the 1985 license were held to be not protectible,
either because of merger of idea with expression, 43 as
139. Id. at 1016.
140. Id. at 1017 n.3.
141. Id. at 1022-26.
142. Summarized at Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-88-20149
VRW, 1992 WL 75423 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1992). For some of the expert testimony
in support of the motions decided at this time, see Jon Swartz, Microsoft-Apple Bat-
tle Building Toward Climax: Expert Testimony Key to Pretrial Motions, MACWEEK,
Feb. 24, 1992, at 95.
143. Apple Computer, 1992 WL 75423 at *1, (1)(a).
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sc6nes i faire,'" or because of a limited number of ways to
express the idea. 45 A similar result was reached in the case
of Hewlett-Packard. 46 At the same time Judge Walker dis-
missed Apple's allegations of copyright infringement
against Windows 3.0147 on the basis that alleged similarities
were already covered by the 1985 license in the same man-
ner as 2.03.148 Judge Walker set the stage for the final de-
termination of the case when he stated as follows:
If the Windows 1.0 "look and feel" when supplemented
with unprotectible expression leads naturally to the
look and feel of the works in question, there is no in-
fringement. If, however, the as yet-unspecified "look
and feel" of the Apple works is not the necessary result
of the grafting of the unprotectible elements onto the
licensed "look and feel" of Windows 1.0, infringement
may be shown. 49
Shortly after these April motions were decided, Apple
began a new marketing campaign for the Macintosh point-
ing out how different it was from Windows. 5° In July 1992,
the chairmen of Apple and Microsoft met to formally an-
nounce their continued cooperation and cross-platform de-
144. Id. at *1, (1)(b).
145. Id. at *1, (1)(c).
146. Id. at *1, (3)-(5) (holding 53 of 54 features were subject to little or no
copyright protection).
147. Apple announced its intention to amend its complaint to include Windows
3.0 and New Wave 3.0 in April 1991. Lawrence M. Fisher, Gains Shown By
Microsoft Despite Slump for Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at D3. It did so by
filing a supplemental complaint on June 28, 1991. See Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
148. Apple Computer, Inc. 1992 WL 75423, at *2; see also 799 F. Supp. at 1017
n.4.
149. 1992 WL 75423.
150. "There's a big difference between a computer screen that looks like a Mac-
intosh and a computer that performs like a Macintosh." See Lawrence M. Fisher,
Apple Finds A New Arena For Its Fight With Microsoft, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1992 at
D1. Another advertising campaign in 1993 was based around the theme "Apple put
their brightest engineers to work in a room with no Windows. And look what they
did. They made it easier to own a color Macintosh .... They made it easier to own a
really powerful Macintosh .... They made it easier to do what you couldn't do
before.... They made it harder to buy a computer with Windows." Apple Advertis-
ing Supplement, PC WK., Mar. 8, 1993.
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velopment. 151  However, the parties stopped short of
bringing the litigation to a close.
The April 1992 ruling was expressed in a short memo-
randum. In large part on motions to reconsider those rul-
ings' 52 Judge Walker rendered his most comprehensive
opinion in August 1992.l1 3 Although not finally dispositive
of all the issues in the litigation, and subject to appeal, this
was the crucial decision in the Apple-Microsoft litigation.
1. The Dissected Features
By this stage in the proceedings, the court had identi-
fied the five basic features of a graphical user interface as
Overlapping windows, Iconic representation, Object open-
ing/closing, Menus, and Iconic manipulation.
Notwithstanding its prior concentration on an exclu-
sively "look and feel" approach, Apple ultimately did join
battle on the more dissected view of things that had domi-
nated Microsoft's approach, and had won over both judges
who had presided over the litigation. Apple's change of
heart was presented by a motion for reconsideration of
Judge Walker's April 14, 1992 grant of Microsoft's motion
for partial summary judgment. 54 Those proceedings had
dealt with the final ten features not covered by the 1985
license. 55 These features were known as items Al, A8, B1,
B2, D1-D3, G4-G6 from the parties' original list.' 56 Fea-
tures Al, A8, B1, B2, and D1-D3 went to the Macintosh
151. Paul Andrews, Microsoft, Apple Clear the Air on Product Teamwork, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, July 16, 1992, at D8. In a joint interview with Bill Gates, Apple Chair-
man John Sculley commented, "Judge Walker substantially limited the claims that
Apple had, and we filed a motion for reconsideration. From a practical standpoint,
we never ran our business on the assumption that we were going to win, so life goes
on." John Markoff, Armistice for Apple and Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1992, at
D1.
152. Apparently, Judge Walker considered refusing the motion for rehearing,
considering the application to have been tardy. James Daly, Judge to Rethink Apple
Case in Copyright Battle, COMPUTERWORLD, May 18, 1992, at 24.
153. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
154. See supra text accompanying note 142.
155. Different features were at issue in the Hewlett-Packard case.
156. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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window displays. Features G5 and G6 went to iconic repre-
sentation. Feature G4 implicated icon manipulation.
Upon the motion for reconsideration as to whether
these features constituted protectible expression, the same
copyright doctrines of merger of idea with expression,
sc6nes i faire, and limited number of ways to express the
idea were discussed. Judge Walker described the function of
these various copyright doctrines as follows:
Certain features of artistic works are so common, or so
obvious, that they require virtually no creative effort to
conjure and thus do not depend on the revenue effect of
copyright protection. The concepts of ideas, scdnes i
faire, and lack of originality fall into this category of
limiting doctrines. On the other hand, placing some
features of artistic works in the exclusive domain of one
author would so raise the costs of creation for others as
to impede the progress of the arts. This accounts for the
doctrines of merger, limited number of ways, and func-
tionality. To apply these doctrines, courts must analyti-
cally dissect the works of an author seeking copyright
protection to determine the metes and bounds of his
property interest in the works. The features of works
that are covered by these limiting doctrines are pro-
tected only from virtually identical copying, for this is
the province of the ultimate free-rider, who makes a
zero investment in creativity. 157
Judge Walker subscribed to the Ninth Circuit's two-
part test for breach of copyright. 158 "First, the 'ideas' of the
works in suit are compared for substantial similarity, using
an 'extrinsic test' or 'objective analysis of expression' ....
If the ideas are substantially similar, then an 'intrinsic test'
or 'subjective analysis of expression' is used.' 1 59 Because
the defendants were arguing limiting doctrines such as
scenes i faire, circuit precedent also required that the Win-
dows features should be "virtually identical" copies of Mac-
intosh features for summary judgment to be refused. 160
157. 799 F. Supp. at 1022.
158. See supra text accompanying note 89 and infra text accompanying note 267.
159. 799 F. Supp. at 1020 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 1027, 1043; see supra text accompanying note 89; see also, M.A. EP-
STEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 390-93 (2d ed. 1989).
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The key issue remained the change in Windows 2.03
from the tiled windows used in Windows 1.0 to the overlap-
ping windows used by the Macintosh (known as similarity
"Al"). Clearly there was an important visual difference be-
tween overlapping and tiling.' 6' For Judge Walker, how-
ever, this difference was a function of technology not
expression.
The advent of overlapping windows in computer inter-
faces was largely the product of the operating memory
capacity of computers outpacing the capacity of monitor
screens to display all the information the computer was
able to generate. The computer memory's ability to
handle greater amounts of information and even at
times simultaneously to run more than one application
program gave rise to the need to accommodate result-
ingly complex visual images on the limited two-dimen-
sional surface available on a computer screen.162
Available video technology allowed only two possible solu-
tions, either switch between screens or split a single screen
into multiple, virtual screens or windows. The Macintosh's
overlapping windows may have looked different, but "the
means of expression of multiple images are limited to split-
ting the screen or switching the images.' 1 63 According to
the court:
Because a programmer must choose between switching
images or splitting the screen, the means of expression
are limited, and merger applies at least to the basic ar-
rangements claimed in similarity Al ....
In any event, the Macintosh interface at most com-
bines a possibly unlicensed switching technique, the
only other means of expression, to that plainly licensed,
161. The court stated:
[T]he overlapping windows of the Macintosh are considerably more versa-
tile and aesthetically pleasing than the tiled windows of Windows 1.0 be-
cause the tiled windows extend in a cumbersome fashion completely along
one axis or the other, making either width or height uniform. Moreover, in
a tiled window system, the windows must shrink as more and more of them
are added to the screen whereas the ability freely to re-size windows in the
Macintosh interface without affecting the size of others allows the user to
size them in relation to the data they contain or for any other reason.
799 F. Supp. at 1030.
162. Id. at 1028.
163. Id. at 1030.
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splitting. Accordingly, the scdnes A faire doctrine ought
also to apply. Finally, use of overlapping windows in
the Xerox, Lilith, and Perq systems in the early 1980s
shows beyond question that this concept is not original
to Apple.164
A similar fate awaited Apple's other claims regarding
the protectibility of aspects of the Macintosh's windowing.
The court held that displaying a window partly on and
partly off the screen (A8), making the top-most window ac-
tive (Bi), and clicking a window to bring it to the top of a
stack (B2) were standard industry features, functions of
switching or splitting screens, and unprotectible under
merger and scdnes A faire doctrines. 65 The way that a
Macintosh window was moved in greyed outline form until
released (D1, D2) and the manner in which it rewrote the
screen thereafter were unprotectible for the same
reasons. 6
6
Regarding the iconic representation issues, the limits
of the technology made for good scdnes A faire and limited
methods of expression arguments (items G5, G6, and the
duplicative G14). Apple's remaining complaints regarding
icons were directed at Hewlett-Packard, specifically the use
of file folder, pages with turned-down corners, different de-
signs to designate different object types, and a trash can.
Again, principles regarding lack of originality and unpro-
tectibility dominated the court's findings against Apple.
Few characteristics escaped summary judgment. 67
Apple's surviving allegations regarding object opening
and closing as well as menu design and layout were also
aimed only at New Wave. The only protectible items which
raised triable issues concerned some graphical representa-
tions indicating the status of an icon expanding into or con-
tracting from a window. 68
Finally, Apple's failing allegations regarding iconic ma-
nipulation primarily implicated New Wave as far as detailed
164. Id. at 1031.
165. Id. at 1031-33.
166. Id. at 1033-34.
167. Id. at 1034-36.
168. Id. at 1036-39.
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issues regarding the movement and indications of selection
or movement. 169 However, Microsoft was implicated by
Apple's primary breach of copyright allegation, which con-
sisted of copying the Macintosh feature of moving an icon
by clicking and dragging (G4). This feature was again held
to be unprotectible under merger and scenes i faire.170
Thus, the combination of the 1985 license agreement
and circuit precedent's reliance on the use of dissection as
to copyrightability as well as the application of a summary
judgment-appropriate extrinsic analysis as to substantial
similarity, led Judge Walker to conclude that the individual
elements that made up the Lisa-Macintosh interface were
either not protectible or Windows 2.03 features were not
substantially similar. Apple's only remaining arguments
were twofold. First, Apple could argue that the entire Lisa-
Macintosh interface was protectible, notwithstanding such
elemental unprotectibility; thus summary judgment was in-
appropriate under an extrinsic substantial similarity test.
Victory in this instance would enable Apple to expose
Microsoft to the dangers inherent in a subjective intrinsic
jury determination of the similarity between the two inter-
faces. Apple's second possible arguement, which was a
poor argument, stated that infringement had occurred on
the basis of the virtual identity (literal copying) of some
original, unlicensed, unprotectible elements.
The court considered the alleged additional similarities
between the Macintosh GUI and Windows 3.0. As Judge
Walker noted in another context Windows 3.0 was "the first
DOS-based windowing program to begin to rival the graph-
ical capability of the Macintosh.' 17 1 Not only did the immi-
nent launch of version 3.0 trigger Apple's lawsuit, but its
release led to the popular view that "Windows makes a PC
work like a Mac." The most important changes to the Win-
dows interface in version 3.0 were the replacement of ver-
sion 2.03's text-based filing system with two graphical
features, Program Manager and File Manager. Program
Manager acts as the default Shell in which objects and
169. Id. at 1039-41.
170. Id. at 1039.
171. Id. at 1025.
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groups of objects are created or manipulated. File Manager
functions much like a DOS utility, facilitating file and direc-
tory management, including copying and moving files, cre-
ating directories, and formatting disks.172
The alleged additional similarities in version 3.0 were
all ruled to be either duplicative of claims regarding 2.03,
unprotectible, lacking in originality, or failing the virtual
identity test. The court summarized as follows:
Not one of the identifiable alleged "additional similari-
ties" comes close to being an identical copy of the cor-
responding features in the Apple works. Since each and
every one of them is subject to at least one limiting doc-
trine, not one of these items can by itself be the basis of
an infringement determination. 173
2. The Rejection of "Look and Feel"
After the dissection began, first with the licensing is-
sues and then with the Ninth Circuit's extrinsic test, Apple's
chances of victory were dramatically reduced. The plain-
tiff's steadfast insistence on a "look and feel' 1 74 approach
was therefore no idle gesture, but the maintenance of the
only winning posture. Although Judge Walker and his
predecessor, Judge Schwarzer, had indicated that a "look
and feel" approach was less than suitable for this case,'175 it
was not until the ruling of August, 1992 that the court dealt
with the issue at length. 76
Apple identified several general aspects of the Macin-
tosh (nee Lisa) GUI that made up the computer's elec-
tronic desktop. What Apple apparently wanted referenced
172. Ironically, it is this separation of File Manager from Program Manager that
makes Windows so unlike a Macintosh. Windows only approaches Macintosh ease
of use when used with an integrated shell such as those shipped with Norton
Desktop for Windows 2.x and PC Tools for Windows 1.0. Even then Windows 3.x
only simulates some processes built into the Macintosh. For example, the Macintosh
structure of the file folder is your directory structure not a metaphor, and file icons
are created automatically when you open a new file. See Kevin Strehlo, PC Tools
Hits the Jackpot in the Windows Shell Game, INFOWORLD, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1.
173. 799 F. Supp. at 1047.
174. See, e.g., M.A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 379-85 (2d ed.
1989).
175. See supra note 137.
176. 799 F. Supp. at 1022-26.
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to the "look and feel" test was the overall office desktop
metaphor that pervaded the Macintosh interface.177 Ac-
cording to the court this was a necessary strategy given the
nature of the computer interface.
Apple's theory is necessitated here because the actual
arrangement of displays on a computer monitor running
any interactive program is largely the product of the
user's efforts, negating any claim of the programmer to
original authorship. This arrangement or "look and
feel" theory is further necessitated because use of
graphic imagery of office objects in computer interfaces
is indisputably unoriginal to Apple. But, more impor-
tantly, use of such objects or an arrangement of them
denotes the "desktop metaphor," not as an idea unify-
ing the expressive elements of the Macintosh interface
but simply as a collection of visual displays and user
commands designed to render use of the computer, as
Apple's expert concedes, more "utilitarian. ' 178
The court's starting position as to protecting the entire
interface was that "[p]urely functional items or an arrange-
ment of them for functional purposes are wholly beyond
the realm of copyright.' 79 This understanding led to the
statement that "[t]he similarity of such functional elements
of a user interface or their arrangement in products of like
kind does not suggest unlawful copying, but standardization
across competing products for functional considerations."'18
On this point, Microsoft's evidence which illustrated that
almost all GUIs incorporate the same elements as the Mac-
intosh interface, 81 was highly influential.
The court's view of the Macintosh interface as intrinsi-
cally utilitarian was reinforced by its economic analysis, as
follows:
Copyright's purpose is to overcome the public
goods externality resulting from the non-excludability
177. Id. at 1023.
178. Id. at 1022-23 (footnote and citation omitted).
179. Id. at 1023.
180. Id.
181. Microsoft identified 29 past and present interfaces, 3 of which were charac-
ter-based, all of which had overlapping Windows, 21 had iconic representation, 10
had object opening/closing, 20 had menus, and 19 iconic manipulation. Id. at 1024.
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of copier/free riders who do not pay the costs of crea-
tion. But overly inclusive copyright protection can pro-
duce its own negative effects by inhibiting the adoption
of compatible standards (and reducing so-called "net-
work externalities"). Such standards in a graphical user
interface would enlarge the market for computers by
making it easier to learn how to use them. Striking the
balance between these considerations, especially in a
new and rapidly changing medium such as computer
screen displays, represents a most ambitious enterprise
By virtue of having been the first commercially suc-
cessful programmer to put these generalized features
together, Apple had several years of market dominance
in graphical user interfaces until Microsoft introduced
Windows 3.0, the first DOS-based windowing program
to begin to rival the graphical capability of the Macin-
tosh. The Macintosh still to this day offers graphical fea-
tures that translate into competitive advantages. To
accept Apple's "desktop metaphor"/"look and feel" ar-
guments would allow it to sweep within its proprietary
embrace not only Windows and New Wave but, at its
option, also other desktop graphical user interfaces
which employ the standardized features of such inter-
faces, and to do this without subjecting Apple's claims
of copyright to the scrutiny which courts have histori-
cally employed. Apple's copyrights would hold for pro-
grams in existence now or in the future-for decades.
One need not profess to know for sure where should lie
the line between expression and idea, between protec-
tion and competition to sense with confidence that this
would afford too much protection and yield too little
competition. 1
82
Thus, Judge Walker refused to apply a substantial simi-
larity analysis to what he considered the essentially func-
tional, utilitarian, and/or unoriginal arrangement of the
desktop metaphor. According to Judge Walker:
The court declines Apple's invitation to use the ad-
vent of the microcomputer and its interface to abandon
traditional standards which govern copyrights and in-




vent some new law based on highly indefinite constructs
such as "look and feel." As a result, if "desktop meta-
phor" is to have any meaning in the context of a tradi-
tional copyright analysis, it should serve merely as a
label for that group of "ideas" embodied in the Macin-
tosh interface devoted to utilitarian uses of that com-
puter, or as a shorthand way of describing the purpose
or object of the panoply of ideas of multiple windows,
iconic representation and manipulation, menus and ob-
ject opening and closing functions to assist computer
users in operation of their machines. "Desktop meta-
phor" does not describe the single unifying idea of the
Macintosh interface, but is simply another name for the
type of interface used on the Macintosh and is by no
means exclusive to it.183
In sum, Apple had failed with both its unorthodox
"look and feel" and its more traditional elemental substan-
tial similarity arguments. As a result, its only remaining ar-
gument was of virtual identity (actual copying) of several
unlicensed, original elements. Judge Walker summarized as
follows:
Of [the items found unprotectible], only Al, D1,
G4 and G5 could possibly be associated with unlicensed
artistic expression to be compared under the "virtually
identical" standard in the course of intrinsic analysis.
This would be the appearance of the gray outline of a
moving window, the change in appearance of icons
when moving, and any special, non-functional artistic
touches involved with the appearance of windows and
icons that are overlapped, other than the art used to
identify the active window, licensed item A4.18 4
3. The Inevitable Summary Adjudication
On August 10, three days after his ruling was an-
nounced, Judge Walker held a conference call with counsel,
183. 799 F. Supp. at 1026.
184. Id. at 1041. Subsequently, item G5 was removed from this list, Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-88-20149-VRW, 1993 WL 207982, at "1, n.1
(N.D. Cal. 1993); see Jane Morrissey, Ruling Dashes Apple's Interface Hopes; Ruling
by U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker on Copyright Infringement Case, PC WK., Aug.
17, 1992, at 117; Paul Andrews, Apple-Microsoft Settlement Now Likely, SEA-rrLE
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1992, at B8; see supra text accompanying note 133; Orenstein, Why
Apple Lost Microsoft Gamble, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Apr. 17, 1992, at 1.
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asking for briefs on the remaining issues to be filed by Au-
gust 31, 1992.185 Although, this haste presumably signaled
the court's interest in promoting a settlement, Apple's pub-
lic position was that Judge Walker's prior decisions would
be appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.8 6 The
August discussion led directly to Judge Walker's order of
April 14, 1993.7 According to this order, "The principal
outstanding issue is whether a jury could reasonably con-
clude that there is substantial similarity of licensed, pro-
tected expression between any of Apple's works and either
Windows 2.03 or Windows 3.0, or between any of Apple's
works and HP's New Wave. '"88
There were three aspects to this analysis: (1) three re-
maining Windows 2.03 elements;189 (2) six remaining New
Wave elements; and (3) an overall comparison between the
interfaces. 9° Crucially, and consistent with his earlier ap-
proach to the "look and feel" issue, Judge Walker stated
that he would apply the "virtual identity" test to all three of
these issues. Noting circuit precedent to this effect,191 Judge
Walker asserted as follows:
Common sense supports this conclusion. The fact
that the work as a whole may be composed of a few
individual elements protectible under the substantial
similarity standard should not imply that the substantial
similarity standard applies to the work as a whole.
Here, the individual elements protectible under the sub-
stantial similarity standard constitute such a small and
185. 1993 WL 207982, at *1.
186. Jon Swartz, Apple Plans to Appeal Ruling in Copyright-Infringement Suit,
MACWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 64 (quoting Apple counsel Jack Brown). Apple's cor-
porate position was that a decision to appeal had not been reached. Emily Barker,
Big Suits, AM. LAW., Oct., 1992, at 89.
187. 1993 WL 207982, at *1. This order also clarified some points and inconsis-
tencies in the prior order. Id.
188. Id.
189. Reduced from the four identified in the August, 1992 judgment. See supra
note 184.
190. See supra note 184.
191. "[C]ompilations consisting largely of uncopyrightable elements receive only
limited protection. As with factual compilations, copyright infringement of compila-
tions consisting largely of uncopyrightable elements should not be found in the ab-
sence of 'bodily appropriation of expression.'" Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas
Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989).
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isolated part of the entire work that substantial similar-
ity should not engulf the much larger number of unpro-
tectible items by providing the appropriate standard for
the entire work. 92
Stating a tentative conclusion that such issues were for the
jury, Judge Walker set a June 2, 1993 pre-trial conference
and a June 28, 1993 trial date. However, he also scheduled
a May 5, 1993 hearing on the defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment and Apple's motion for reconsideration of
the court's decision to use a virtual identity standard. On
May 18, 1993, Judge Walker issued his rulings on these
issues. 93
First, Judge Walker addressed the three remaining ele-
ments previously identified as unprotectible under a sub-
stantial similarity standard but involving sufficient original
artistic expression to be protectible under a virtual identity
test. 94 These elements were overlapping rectangular win-
dows over a muted background (item Al), simulating the
movement of a Window by displaying a gray outline of the
Window during a drag (D1), and the animation associated
with dragging an icon around the desktop. In all three
cases Judge Walker held that the Windows/New Wave im-
plementations were not virtually identical to the Lisa-
Macintosh. 95
Second, Judge Walker decided similar issues regarding
an additional six elements in New Wave. Of these elements
Judge Walker found four that disclosed a jury issue on the
question of virtual identity, rapid sequence of expanding
and contracting Windows during iconization and maximiza-
tion (G28 and G29), dimming an icon upon opening of a
folder (G33), and the use of a trash can as a discard folder
(H2). 96 Although only directed at New Wave, these four
allegations implicated Microsoft because Apple was claim-
ing contributory infringement by Microsoft.
192. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-88-20149-VRW, 1993 WL
207982, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
193. 821 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
194. See supra note 184.
195. 821 F. Supp. at 619-20.
196. Id. at 620-22.
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Third, the court reiterated its ruling that in comparing
Windows with Lisa-Macintosh as a whole the jury would be
instructed on a virtual identity standard.197 Similarly, the
court maintained that the same standard would apply to the
New Wave comparison with Apple's products. 98
Fourth, Judge Walker denied Microsoft's motion for
partial summary judgment on Apple's contributory in-
fringement claim. As the court noted "Liability for contrib-
utory infringement arises when a defendant knowingly
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
activity." 99 Microsoft had argued that its relationship with
Hewlett-Packard regarding New Wave should be character-
ized as "routine software developer behavior." 2°° The court
held that Apple had raised sufficient questions of material
fact on this issue and Hewlett-Packard's related issue of
joint and several liability with Microsoft to preclude sum-
mary judgment.20 ' Judge Walker concluded in the following
manner:
In summary, the court will submit the following
questions for the trial which is scheduled to commence
on June 28, 1993: (1) Are items G28, G29 and G33 in
all versions of New Wave and H2 in New Wave Devel-
oper's Release alone substantially similar to their
equivalents in Apple's works? (2) Are any of HP's
works as a whole virtually identical to any of Apple's
works? (3) Are any of Microsoft's works as a whole vir-
tually identical to any of Apple's works? (4) If any of
HP's works infringe any of Apple's works, is Microsoft
contributorily liable for any infringement on the part of
HP? (5) If any of Microsoft's works infringe any of Ap-
197. Id. at 623.
198. Id. at 623-25. The court held that this standard should apply notwithstand-
ing the arguable virtual identity of four New Wave items. This was because the
court viewed those four elements quantitatively and qualitatively insignificant when
comparing the works as a whole. Id. at 623-24.
199. Id. at 625 (citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Manage-
ment, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir.
1987)).
200. 821 F. Supp. at 626.
201. Id. The court ruled on some additional matters at this time, ruling that H-P
was a sub-licensee of Microsoft and thus similarly protected by the 1985 agreement.
The court also disposed of some minor arguments regarding infringement of Macin-
tosh Applets, and some process issues.
1994]
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
pie's works, is HP jointly and severally liable for any
infringement on the part of Microsoft?2 "2
Not surprisingly, a Microsoft spokesperson described
the May 18 rulings as "extremely positive. 20 3 A few days
later the three litigants agreed to remove the case from the
court calendar.20 4 The June 2 pre-trial conference pro-
ceeded as planned. Faced with Apple's motion of non-op-
position to the defendants' motions for final summary
judgment on the virtual identity issues, Judge Walker dis-
missed the case.205  Presumably, Apple's non-opposition
was to accelerate the inevitable entry of judgment in de-
fendants' favor and to expedite an appeal.
In June, 1993 Apple C.E.O. John Sculley resigned,20 6
and in September the company's vice president in charge of
the Microsoft litigation was dismissed, 207 himself filing suit
against Apple and incidentally arguing that Sculley had
been forced out by the Apple board.208 Meanwhile Apple
reported serious economic losses,20 9 and in an effort to
restructure, Apple began laying off large numbers of work-
ers.210 Adding insult to injury, in July 1993 Apple and Hew-
202. Id. at 631.
203. Samuel Perry, Judge Narrows Scope of Key Apple Lawsuit Ruling Favors
Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard in Closely Watched Software Case, BUFFALO NEWS, May
20, 1993, at C3.
204. No Jury Trial in Apple Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at L35.
205. Jane Morrissey, Judge Dismisses Apple Suit, PC WK., June 7, 1993, at 21.
Apple filed an appeal in late January 1994. See PC WK., Jan. 31, 1994, at 3.
206. Jonathan Weber, Apple Computer's Sculley to Give Up CEO Position, L.A.
TIMES, June 19, 1993, at Al. Sculley became chairman of Spectrum Information
Technologies. See generally N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at D15, col. 5.
207. According to Apple he was laid off as part of their cost-cutting process.
John Markoff, Apple Executive is Let Go and Sues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at 19.
The suit was dropped after Apple reinstated his severance benefits. SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Dec. 29, 1993, at B3.
208. Laura Evenson & Ken Siegman, Suit Alleges Board Fired Sculley, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 28, 1993, at B3.
209. The day after reporting its latest bad quarter results Apple shares plum-
meted 23%. Kathryn Jones, Apple Stock is Hammered for 23% Loss, N. Y. TIMES,
July 17, 1993, § 1, at 35.
210. John Markoff, Apple Executive is Let Go and Sues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1993, § 1, at 39; see also John Markoff, A Search for Direction at Apple, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1993, at Dl. Apple's problems have been worsened by the generally luke-
warm reception given to its Newton PDA (personal digital assistant), a product
championed by Sculley, cf Paul Andrews, Let Me Spell It Out: Newton Doesn't De-
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lett-Packard filed papers with Judge Walker requesting
approximately $10 million in attorneys' fees.21'
V. THE RISE AND FALL OF "LOOK AND FEEL"
As demonstrated by the Windows litigation, conceptu-
alizing and applying copyright law in computer software
cases remains problematic.212 In this section the various is-
sues involved in "look and feel" litigation are discussed, as
a prelude to an evaluation of the Windows case itself.
Although famous for the visibility of some of its computer
industry litigants, including Lotus Development, Inc., Sy-
mantec Corp., Borland International, Inc., and now Apple
and Microsoft, the "look and feel" doctrine is relatively
new and underdeveloped.213
In fact the "look and feel" question is as much a symp-
tom of confusion in the resolution of software copyright
cases as it is any discrete legal issue. As one court summa-
rized the state of the law:
[T]he case law and commentators in the area of copy-
right protection seem woefully ill-equipped to provide a
systematic means for analyzing copyright issues as they
arise in the context of computer software. Indeed, the
heart of copyright law, designed to accommodate
unimaginable varieties of creative expression, has man-
dated resolution of disputes on a case-by-case basis.
What magnifies the underlying dilemma, however, is
serve Earlier Pans, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at D2, and by a price squeeze on
its products caused by the tumbling prices of IBM-compatible machines.
211. AM. LAW. MEDIA, L.P., The Recorder, June 28, 1993, at 2. No specific
number was given in the filing, but an H-P source was quoted as seeking $5 million.
Id. Fantasy Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
2992 (1993) (appeal on issue of attorneys' fees-underlying case concerning whether
John Fogerty's solo song "The Old Man Down the Road" infringed copyright on
"Run Through the Jungle" he recorded with Credence Clearwater Revival).
212. See NIMMER, supra note 14, at 1.0311][2].
213. Notwithstanding, the "look and feel" approach to software copyright viola-
tions clearly is related to the more widely drawn "total concept and feel" approach.
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1990); Alotti v. R. Dakin & Co.,
831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.
1987); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984); Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
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the realization that copyright law was not designed to
accommodate computer software protection.214
The frequently arcane nature of the copyright inquiry
aside, there are several reasons why interface cases have
been difficult to resolve. First, conceptually, "look and
feel" may be seen as going to copyrightability, or "substan-
tial similarity," or both. Second, cases which are heralded
as providing clarity frequently do so because they are single
issue cases. For example, when there is direct evidence of
copying, any "substantial similarity" inquiry is eliminated.
Such precedents do not transfer well into the multiple issue
case such as a situation where a court faces both copyright-
ability and "substantial similarity" issues.
Finally, many of the substantive issues are distorted by
process considerations. For example, while the sub-text in
many interface cases is one of jury control such as the ex-
tent to which the jury will be allowed to make a subjective,
intrinsic comparison, many copyright cases are decided
without a jury trial.215 In addition, many copyright cases
come up on motions for injunctive relief,216 or on motions
for summary judgment,217 further distorting the substantive
message of the case with procedural requirements.
214. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (D. Colo. 1992),
rev'd and remanded in part, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
215. See, e.g., Consul Tec, Inc. v. Interface Systems, Inc., No. 90-CV-70757-DT,
1991 WL 427891 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 1991).
216. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 975 F.2d 832, 837
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Rodesch v. Disctronics, Inc., 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting
a preliminary injunction); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886
F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989) (reviewing district court's decision to grant a preliminary
injunction); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting a
permanent injunction); Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 793 F.
Supp. 1557, 1565 (D.N.M. 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993) (granting a
preliminary injunction). A district court may "grant temporary and final injunctions
on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).
217. One leading software case summed up the summary judgment standard as
follows:
Summary judgment for a defendant accused of copyright infringement is
appropriate when the plaintiff fails to show a genuine issue regarding
whether the ideas and expressive elements of the works are substantially
similar. This is so because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the work protected by
plaintiff's copyright. A "genuine issue" exists when the plaintiff provides
140
In fact the interface protection cases deal with several
different, yet not entirely discrete issues.218 The first and
what is only superficially the key issue is the explicit inquiry
whether non-literal aspects of computer programs, specifi-
cally user interfaces, will be granted copyright protection.
This issue will be referred to as the broad question of
copyrightability. The second inquiry asks what is the role of
the idea-"expression of idea" dichotomy in software cases?
For example, does this narrow issue of copyrightability de-
termine the protectibility of interfaces on a case-by-case ba-
sis? Third, should courts use a unified or multi-faceted
test? This question is posed in two contexts: To what ex-
tent should questions of copyrightability and "substantial
similarity" be treated collectively, and to what extent
should courts develop multi-pronged tests for either or both
of these issues? Finally, where courts have developed
multi-faceted tests what are the relative weights that should
be given to extrinsic and intrinsic judgments, and who
should make such evaluations?
A. The Broad Question of Interface Copyrightability
This broad question of copyrightability would seem to
be the key to the "look and feel" cases. However, this situ-
ation occurs only if you take an extreme position on the
issue. An example of an extreme position is that there
should be zero protection against the copying of non-literal
aspects of a work.219 More subtle questions include
indicia of "a sufficient disagreement" concerning the substantial similarity
of two works "to require submission to a jury."
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1992) (cita-
tions omitted).
218. See NIMMER, supra note 14, at 1.08, 1.09, 1.13.
219. Cf. Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp.
576 (E.D. La. 1991):
Plaintiff urges the court to follow the law of another jurisdiction and find
that user interfaces (input and output reports) are copyrightable since they
have evolved from ideas to expressions .... While the reasoning of Lotus
may be persuasive.... this court is bound to follow the law of the Fifth
Circuit. Under the law of this circuit, formats are not copyrightable. Plains
Cotton Co-Op, Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256,
1262 (5th Cir. 1987) .... [which] explicitly rejected Whelan Associates, Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 582.
1994] GUI WARS 141
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
whether the "look and feel" of a program goes to substan-
tial similarity analysis in the same way that "total concept
or feel" is utilized in literary works.
One of the most frequently cited and criticized cases is
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory.22°
Whelan concerned a custom-designed record-keeping pro-
gram for dental laboratories, non-literal aspects of which
had allegedly been copied. The Whelan court's decision to
protect non-literal aspects is relatively uncontroversial.
However, it gave operational effect to that decision through
the idea-expression dichotomy, adopting an idea-expression
test which strongly favored finding an expression. Whelan
therefore dramatically increased the level of copyright pro-
tection for the interface per se. Its rationale was that "[t]he
rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection be-
yond the literal computer code, would provide the proper
incentive for programmers by protecting their most valua-
ble efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the
development of new computer devices that accomplish the
same end."221
In the process of answering the broad question of
copyrightability, the Whelan court adopted a test for the
narrow issue of copyrightability which was skewed in favor
of interface protection.222 While the Whelan approach to
the narrow issue of copyrightability has attracted considera-
ble dissent,223 its broad copyrightability decision, that non-
literal aspects are protectible, has found general support.224
220. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
221. Id. at 1237.
222. Holding an interface to be an expression, not an idea, makes it difficult to
dissect or filter out the non-protectible aspects.
223. See infra text accompanying note 247.
224. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D.
Mass. 1992) (citing Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), Judge Keaton
said that "the court explicitly approved determinations with respect to the copyright-
ability of certain nonliteral, noncode (nonstructural) aspects of the 1-2-3 spreadsheet
in Paperback."); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
1992) (implicit that "overall look and feel" is part of the intrinsic stage of the Ninth
Circuit's bifurcated test); see also Mistretta v. Curole, No. CIV.A.92-0162, 1992 WL
28118 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1992); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,
780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Consul Tec, Inc. v. Interface Systems, Inc., No.
CIV.A.90-CV-70757, 1991 WL 427891 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 1991) (non-literal as-
pects may be copyrighted); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.
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This generally held position is reflected by Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc.,225 in which
the Ninth Circuit asserted: "[w]hether the non-literal com-
ponents of a program, including the structure, sequence and
organization and user interface, are protected depends on
whether, on the particular facts of each case, the compo-
nent in question qualifies as an expression of an idea, or an
idea itself. ' 226 The court considered a finding of copying to
be sustainable, stating "[t]he special master's report sets
forth, in detailed form, the various similarities between the
programs. These similarities, both in idea and expression,
would permit a reasonable person to find an unlawful ap-
propriation, a capture by the infringing work of the 'total
concept and feel' of Johnson's work. 227
This approach is consistent with the leading case of
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,228
which involved an operating system translator integrat-
ed into a mainframe scheduling program. The alleged-
ly infringing software in question had all literal aspects
of the copyrighted program removed, and replaced
with a "clean-room" design.229  Nevertheless, the court
was prepared to extend protection even without copy-
ing of literal elements.230  However, while endorsing
the line of authority that had recognized the protec-
tion of non-literal elements,23' Computer Associates
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (using the Ninth Circuit's bifurcated test and finding
"substantial similarity").
225. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1989).
226. Id. at 1175.
227. Id. at 1176 (footnote omitted).
228. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
229. Id. at 700. I.e., the important issue related to version 3.5, not the literally
copied 3.4.
230. Id. at 702-03.
231. According to Computer Associates:
While computer programs are not specifically listed as part of the above
statutory definition, the legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress
intended them to be considered literary works.
The syllogism that follows from the foregoing premises is a powerful
one: if the non-literal structures of literary works are protected by copy-
right; and if computer programs are literary works, as we are told by the
legislature; then the non-literal structures of computer programs are pro-
tected by copyright. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234 ("By analogy to other
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refused to allow the issue of copyrightability to be pre-
empted.232
B. The Idea-"Expression of Idea" Dichotomy
It is trite doctrine that copyright law extends not to a
mere idea but only to the expression of that idea.233 As ex-
plained above, the idea-expression of idea dichotomy as-
sumed importance in the user interface cases because it was
thought that it was the key to copyrightability in this
area. 234
In Whelan, the defense took the position that "the
structure of a computer program is, by definition, the idea
and not the expression of the idea, and therefore that the
structure cannot be protected by the program copyright. ' '23 5
The court rejected this approach and, in the process, formu-
lated the following test:
[T]he line between idea and expression may be drawn
with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the
work in question. In other words, the purpose or func-
tion of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and
everything that is not necessary to that purpose or func-
tion would be part of the expression of the idea.236
literary works, it would thus appear that the copyrights of computer pro-
grams can be infringed even absent copying of the literal elements of the
program."). We have no reservation in joining the company of those courts
that have already ascribed to this logic. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v.
Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Lotus Dev.
Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 54; Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone
Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455-56 (N.D.Ga.1987); Q-Co Industries,
Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615 (S.D.N.Y.1985); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S
& H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn.1985).
Id. (references omitted).
232. "However, that conclusion does not end our analysis. We must determine
the scope of copyright protection that extends to a computer program's non-literal
structure." Id. at 703 (references omitted). See infra text accompanying note 253.
233. See supra text accompanying note 79.
234. See supra text accompanying note 220; see also, Synercom Technology, Inc.
v. University Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (suggesting no pro-
tection for non-literal aspects of computer program-because idea and expression
not distinguishable).
235. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d. 1222, 1235 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
236. Id. at 1236.
Along with Whelan, the well-known case of Lotus De-
velopment Corporation v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional237 is assumed to be the high point of interface
protection. Lotus involved the plaintiff's famous 1-2-3
spreadsheet and the alleged infringement of Lotus's copy-
rights by the defendant's VP-Planner. Lotus was distin-
guished by a comprehensive and informed judgment
written by the eminent jurist and scholar, Robert Keeton.
As in Whelan, the central issue in Lotus was whether non-
literal elements of computer programs were copyright-
able.3 s As noted by Judge Keeton, copyright protection for
artistic works extends beyond the literal expression to a
protection of such non-literal aspects such as "the work's
expression of setting, characters, or plot with a resulting
substantial similarity. '239 Judge Keeton transported this
concept to the user interface with the following language:
"When computer programs include elements-both literal
and nonliteral-'that can be identified separately from, and
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian as-
pects of the article,' they are potentially copyrightable. 240
Subsequently, Judge Keeton somewhat downplayed
the "look and feel" concept, viewing it as a conclusion
rather than a helpful test on the question of copyright-
ability.241 That approach was employed by Lotus, which
suggested "that the copyrightable nonliteral elements are
more appropriately described by the phrase 'user inter-
face.' "242 For Judge Keeton the dominant copyrightability
issue in Lotus was whether 1-2-3 was an idea or an expres-
sion of an idea, a decision for which he proposed a three
part test, as follows:
237. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
238. "[D]efendants assert that only literal manifestations of computer programs
are copyrightable. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that copyright protection
extends to all elements of computer programs that embody original expression,
whether literal or nonliteral, including any original expression embodied in a pro-
gram's 'user interface.' " Id. at 45-46.
239. Id. at 51.
240. Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 62-63.
242. Id. at 63. For plaintiff, that meant "the menus (and their structure and or-
ganization), the long prompts, the screens on which they appear, the function key
assignments, [and] the macro commands and language." Id.
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FIRST, in making the determination of "copyright-
ability," the decisionmaker must focus upon alterna-
tives ...along the scale from the most generalized
conception to the most particularized, and choose some
formulation-some conception or definition of the
"idea"-for the purpose of distinguishing between the
idea and its expression ....
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether
an alleged expression of the idea is limited to elements
essential to expression of that idea (or is one of only a
few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes
identifiable elements of expression not essential to
every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not
essential to every expression of the idea, the deci-
sionmaker must focus on whether those elements are a
substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable
"work. ,243
Judge Keeton may have been less than enthusiastic re-
garding "look and feel" as a general test. Notwithstanding,
his approach to deciding copyrightability rested heavily on
a related concept, "[t]o determine copyrightability, a court
need not-and, indeed, should not-dissect every element
of the allegedly protected work. Rather, the court need
only identify those elements that are copyrightable, and
then determine whether those elements, considered as a
whole, have been impermissibly copied." 244 For Judge Kee-
ton, the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure passed his
three part test.245
Lotus represents a major advancement in the Whelan
approach because it used a far more sophisticated test for
the idea-expression dichotomy. However, Lotus is not the
definitive "look and feel" case as it is sometimes character-
ized. The only real issue in Lotus was copyrightability,
since copying (infringement) in that case was obvious. 246
Although no friend of dissection, Lotus did not have to ad-
dress the additional complication of "substantial similarity."
243. Id. at 60-61 (upper case in original).
244. Id. at 67.
245. Id. at 65-68.
246. Id. at 68-70.
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The joint determination of these issues can be seen in
Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems,
Inc. ,247 involving computer reading software. The Autoskill
court adopted a bifurcated approach. That approach in-
volved excluding unprotectible items prior to applying a
substantial similarity test.248 In dealing with the idea-ex-
pression dichotomy, the court rejected Whelan's "more
than one idea-then its an expression" approach.249 The
Autoskill court preferred the "abstractions" approach
which originated with Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corporation,250 and which was the first
prong of Judge Keeton's legal test in Lotus. 251 When it
came to the substantial similarity part of the analysis the
court rejected a "look and feel" approach:
First, the test is more appropriate when evaluating sim-
plistic works where unanalytic evaluation is appropriate
.... The importance of the role of the fact finder is
stressed in the "total concept and feel" test and reliance
on expert testimony is not appropriate. Furthermore,
the term "concept" appears to contradict the rule that
copyright protection be extended only to expression.
Likewise the term "feel" is contrary to the necessity of
analysis. In this case, the "total concept and feel" test
would involve the impressions of the court as to the
question of substantial similarity. Because the court did
not operate the programs, in order to utilize this test I
could only rely upon a few photos of selected screen
displays and a logic flow chart. Such a determination
would therefore not be meaningful. I would need to
rely upon the explanations and impressions of the ex-
pert witnesses which is inappropriate. In addition, the
247. 793 F. Supp. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993).
248. Id. at 1565.
249. This was rejected in the following terms:
Autoskill urges me to accept the Whelan court's reasoning, however I de-
cline to do so. The Whelan court's approach although, a temptingly sim-
plistic and bright line test, cannot account for the reality that many ideas
may exist in a given work. Adopting the Whelan rule would also put a
damper upon the important goal of encouraging others to build upon the
ideas conveyed in a work.
Id. (citations omitted).
250. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
251. See supra text accompanying note 243.
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reading programs at issue here are complex. For all
these reasons, I decline to utilize the "total concept and
feel" test in this case.252
The synthesis of the Nichols/Lotus approach to the
idea-expression dichotomy and the "substantial similarity"
issue was taken to new heights in Computer Associates,253
which adopted an "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison"
three-part test.
[W]e think that district courts would be well-advised to
undertake a three-step procedure ... in order to deter-
mine whether the non-literal elements of two or more
computer programs are substantially similar. This ap-
proach breaks no new ground; rather, it draws on such
familiar copyright doctrines as merger, sc6nes i faire,
and public domain ....
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this ap-
proach, a court would first break down the allegedly in-
fringed program into its constituent structural parts.
Then, by examining each of these parts for such things
as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily inci-
dental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from
the public domain, a court would then be able to sift out
all non-protectible material. Left with a kernel, or pos-
sible kernels, of creative expression after following this
process of elimination, the court's last step would be to
compare this material with the structure of an allegedly
infringing program. The result of this comparison will
determine whether the protectible elements of the pro-
grams at issue are substantially similar so as to warrant
a finding of infringement.254
A later court summarized the application of the first two
parts of the test as follows:
Judge Hand's abstraction analysis forces differentiation
of the unprotectible idea and protectible expression.
The abstraction method also properly recognizes that a
computer program contains many distinct ideas .... By
separating the program into manageable components,
this method eases the court's task of discerning the
boundaries of protectible expression.
252. 793 F. Supp. at 1570 (citations omitted).
253. See supra text accompanying note 228.
254. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
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After separating the program into manageable
components, the court must next filter the unprotectible
components of the program from the protectible ex-
pression. The court must filter out as unprotectible the
ideas, expression necessarily incident to the idea, ex-
pression already in the public domain, expression dic-
tated by external factors (like the computer's
mechanical specifications, compatibility with other pro-
grams, and demands of the industry served by the pro-
gram), and expression not original to the programmer
or author. 255
Subsequent to Computer Associates, Judge Keeton de-
cided Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland Interna-
tional, Inc. ,256 in which the plaintiff alleged that the 1-2-3
copyrights were infringed by the defendant's Quattro Pro
"emulation" or "1-2-3 compatible" interface. Using this in-
terface, users familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 commands could di-
rectly operate Quattro Pro, which has a different native
command interface.257 In Borland, the court was spared the
difficulties associated with the "substantial similarity" in-
quiry, because of direct evidence of copying. 2-' The domi-
nant issue, therefore, was one of copyrightability. Judge
Keeton made extensive reference to the Second Circuit's
opinion in Computer Associates.259 However, he concluded
that Computer Associates' "Abstraction-Filtration-Com-
parison" three-prong test for "substantial similarity" was
255. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 975 F.2d 832, 838-39 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (citations omitted). See also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
256. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992). The appeal is pending following Judge
Keeton's granting of a preliminary injunction. Judge Keeton has scheduled a trial
on damages for October 1994. Jane Morrissey, Borland Readies Its Appeal Follow-
ing a Court Injunction, PC WK., Aug. 23, 1993, at 8.
257. A growing number of programs have application-migration help. For ex-
ample, both Microsoft's Word for Windows 2.0 and Lotus Development's Ami Pro
3.0 offer "help" for WordPerfect users. However, the accepted distinction between
these functions and the Lotus-Borland dispute is that the 1-2-3 commands could be
executed directly from the interface, rather than routing users through a "transla-
tor." For example, calling up WordPerfect Help in Word for Windows 2.x displays a
dialog box from which the user selects a WordPerfect function. The program then
plays a demonstration of Word for Windows performing the equivalent function.
258. 799 F. Supp. at 208.
259. See supra text accompanying note 228.
1994] 149GUI WARS
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
consistent with his own Lotus test. According to Judge
Keeton:
The Second Circuit founded its abstraction step on the
opinions of Judge Learned Hand that were also the
foundation of the first step of the copyrightability test
stated in my Memorandum and Order. The second step
of that copyrightability test parallels the Second Cir-
cuit's "filtration" step.
The third step of the Second Circuit test, "compari-
son," serves two functions. The first concerns the issue
addressed in the third step of the "copyrightability" test
I have tentatively adopted for this case-whether the
expressive elements of the allegedly copyrightable work
are a substantial part of it. I conclude that in this re-
spect the two tests are compatible substantively though
different in methodology. The other function that the
Second Circuit's "comparison" step serves is empha-
sized in the term used to identify it-"comparison."
The comparison is between the relevant portions of the
allegedly infringing work and the expressive elements
of the allegedly copyrightable work to ascertain
whether any part of the allegedly infringing work is sim-
ilar to expressive elements of the allegedly copyright-
able work that are a substantial part of the allegedly
copyrightable work (i.e., whether there is substantial
similarity in the mixed law-fact sense). I conclude,
again, that in relation to this comparison, the Second
Circuit's test and the combination of the "copyright-
ability" and "substantial similarity" tests I have adopted
tentatively are compatible substantively, though differ-
ent in methodology.260
If Lotus and Computer Associates had much in common re-
garding their approach to copyrightability, the latter case
distinguished itself with an unambiguous rejection of the
Whelan approach to the idea-expression dichotomy. Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, Whelan was based on a false
premise, that a computer program contained only one idea:
This criticism focuses not upon the program's ultimate
purpose but upon the reality of its structural design. As
we have already noted, a computer program's ultimate
260. 799 F. Supp. at 211-12.
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function or purpose is the composite result of interact-
ing subroutines. Since each subroutine is itself a pro-
gram, and thus, may be said to have its own 'idea,'
Whelan's general formulation that a program's overall
purpose equates with the program's idea is descriptively
inadequate.
Accordingly, we think that Judge Pratt [in the Dis-
trict Court] wisely declined to follow Whelan. In addi-
tion to noting the weakness in the Whelan definition of
"program-idea," mentioned above, Judge Pratt found
that Whelan's synonymous use of the terms "structure,
sequence, and organization" demonstrated a flawed un-
derstanding of a computer program's method of opera-
tion. Rightly, the district court found Whelan's
rationale suspect because it is so closely tied to what can
now be seen-with the passage of time-as the opin-
ion's somewhat outdated appreciation of computer
261science.
C. Copyrightability and Substantial Similarity
Although Whelan noted the use by other courts of a
bifurcated test for substantial similarity, it preferred a uni-
fied test.262 Its rationale was primarily a negative view of
the "ordinary observer" test which makes up the second
prong of many bifurcated tests, doubting its usefulness in
complex computer software cases.
The court in Computer Associates, with its "Abstrac-
tion-Filtration-Comparison" approach, 263 clearly saw the is-
sues of copyrightability and "substantial similarity" to be
intermingled. Equally, however, and as recognized by Judge
Keeton in Borland ,26 abstraction and filtration tend to go
to copyrightability, whereas comparison goes to "substan-
tial similarity. '265
261. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 705-06 (citations omitted).
262. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d
Cir. 1986).
263. See supra text accompanying note 254.
264. See supra text accompanying note 260.
265. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 975 F.2d 832, 838-40
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying first two elements of the Computer Associates test to de-
termine copyrightability).
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In fact, Computer Associates seems to have placed re-
newed emphasis on the issue of copyrightability at the ex-
pense of the substantial similarity issue in interface cases,
noting the following:
While, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of
ways in which a programmer may effectuate certain
functions within a program,-i.e., express the idea em-
bodied in a given subroutine-efficiency concerns may
so narrow the practical range of choice as to make only
one or two forms of expression workable options.
Efficiency is an industry-wide goal. Since, as we
have already noted, there may be only a limited number
of efficient implementations for any given program
task, it is quite possible that multiple programmers,
working independently, will design the identical method
employed in the allegedly infringed work. Of course, if
this is the case, there is no copyright infringement.,
Under these circumstances, the fact that two pro-
grams contain the same efficient structure may as likely
lead to an inference of independent creation as it does
to one of copying. Thus, since evidence of similarly effi-
cient structure is not particularly probative of copying, it
should be disregarded in the overall substantial similarity
analysis.266
D. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Judgments
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's
Corp.,267 the Ninth Circuit adopted a bifurcated test for
"substantial similarity, '268 beginning with a factual inquiry
as to any substantial similarity of ideas:
We shall call this the "extrinsic test." It is extrinsic be-
cause it depends not on the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and ana-
lyzed. Such criteria include the type of artwork in-
266. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (citations omit-
ted, emphasis added).
267. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
268. The test dates back to Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947); see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Corp., 798 F. Supp.
1499, 1513-14 (D. Colo. 1992), rev'd and remanded in part, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.
1993).
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volved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the
setting for the subject. Since it is an extrinsic test, ana-
lytic dissection and expert testimony are appropriate.
Moreover, this question may often be decided as a mat-
ter of law.
The determination of when there is substantial sim-
ilarity between the forms of expression is necessarily
more subtle and complex .... The test to be applied in
determining whether there is substantial similarity in
expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one-depend-
ing on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.
It is intrinsic because it does not depend on the type of
external criteria and analysis which marks the extrinsic
test .... Because this [test] is an intrinsic test, analytic
dissection and expert testimony are not appropriate.269
What Krofft failed to do was to incorporate any
copyrightability analysis into its two prong test. This step
was provided by the court in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co.270
To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether
similarities result from unprotectible expression, it is
appropriate under Krofft's intrinsic test to perform ana-
lytic dissection of similarities. Although even unpro-
tectible material should be considered when
determining if there is substantial similarity of expres-
sion no substantial similarity may be found under the
intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates
that all similarities in expression arise from the use of
common ideas.271
269. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164; see
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(applying this test in a software case). Even in the absence of a formally bifurcated
test, other courts apply similar concepts. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533
F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu
Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Little Souls, Inc. v. Petits, 789 F. Supp. 56,
57 (D. Mass. 1992) (espousing apparently different two-part test, "copying" inquiry
followed by "illicit copying" inquiry).
270. Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
271. Id. at 901 (citation omitted). In a subsequent opinion, the court summed up
the modification to Krofft as follows:
We have inserted a third part to Krofft's substantial similarity test between
the intrinsic and extrinsic tests. The third part of the test examines whether
the idea and its expression are "separable." If the idea and expression are
inseparable, we will not find substantial similarity because that "would con-
fer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner." We can analytically
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Subsequently, in Brown Bag Software v. Symantec
Corp. ,272 the court clarified this utilization of dissection as
applying also to the expression of the idea.
Under the original formulation of Krofft's "extrinsic"
component, a plaintiff needed to prove only the "simi-
larity of ideas" in the two programs. Today, however,
the extrinsic test looks at more than just the similarity
of ideas. The extrinsic test.., has become an "objective
... analys[is] of expression."
To establish infringement of a copyright, the two
works in question must also meet the second compo-
nent of the test set forth in Krofft, the "intrinsic test."
The intrinsic test, according to Krofft, should measure
"substantial similarity in expressions ... depending on
the response of the ordinary reasonable person .... [I]t
does not depend on the type of external criteria and
analysis which marks the extrinsic test." In applying the
intrinsic test, therefore, "analytic dissection and expert
testimony are not appropriate" .... Under the reformu-
lated extrinsic test, we mean to perpetuate "analytic dis-
section" as a tool for comparing not only ideas but also
expression.273
Brown Bag's commitment to dissection at the
copyrightability and copying stages of the analysis274 dra-
matically reduces the level of protection for interfaces, run-
ning counter to the more gestalt approach to protecting
non-literal aspects.
dissect similarities in expression between works to determine whether all
similarities in expression necessarily arise from the use of common ideas.
Rodesch v. Disctronics, Inc., 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (full
text of case available on Westlaw).
272. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
273. Id. at 1475 (citations omitted).
274. As Brown Bag related:
Analytic dissection is relevant not only to the copying element of a copy-
right infringement claim, but also to the claim's ownership element. One
aspect of the ownership element is the copyrightability of the subject mat-
ter and, more particularly, the scope of whatever copyright lies therein. To
the extent a plaintiff's work is unprotected or unprotectable under copy-
right, the scope of the copyright must be limited. . . . Thus, where two
works are found to be similar without regard to the scope of the copyright
in the plaintiff's work ... the source of the similarity must be identified and
a determination made as to whether this source is covered by plaintiff's
copyright.
Id. at 1476 (citations and footnote omitted).
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Indeed, with Brown Bag the Ninth Circuit completed
the movement away from Whelan, and it substantially re-
duced non-literal copyright protection for the interface.
The Whelan court had sought to extend general protection
to non-literal aspects by using an idea-expression test that
dramatically favored the latter. Subsequent cases such as
Lotus and Computer Associates275 took a more centrist ap-
proach to the dichotomy by using multi-faceted tests which
involved considerable dissection or filtration. Brown Bag
confirmed the reach of such dissection.
CONCLUSION-EVALUATING THE WINDOWS
LITIGATION
Copyright continues to be the dominant and, arguably,
the most appropriate276 method for the protection of intel-
lectual property in software. However, as the "look and
275. According to Computer Associates,
[i]nitially, in a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theoretical
plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and
isolate each level of abstraction contained within it. This process begins
with the code and ends with an articulation of the program's ultimate func-
tion. Along the way, it is necessary essentially to retrace and map each of
the designer's steps-in the opposite order in which they were taken during
the program's creation....
Once the program's abstraction levels have been discovered, the sub-
stantial similarity inquiry moves from the conceptual to the concrete....
This process entails examining the structural components at each level of
abstraction to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was
"idea" or was dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessar-
ily incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the program itself;
or taken from the public domain and hence is nonprotectable
expression....
Once a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed pro-
gram which are "ideas" or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or
taken from the public domain, there may remain a core of protectable ex-
pression. In terms of a work's copyright value, this is the golden nugget. At
this point, the court's substantial similarity inquiry focuses on whether the
defendant copied any aspect of this protected expression, as well as an as-
sessment of the copied portion's relative importance with respect to the
plaintiff's overall program.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-710 (2d Cir. 1992) (cita-
tions omitted).
276. Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025 (1990). See NiMMER, supra note 14, at 1 2.05 (quoting guidelines issued by
Patent and Trademark Office).
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feel" approach continues to decline, software developers
will be forced to look elsewhere for protection for their in-
terfaces.27 If the most difficult "look and feel" issues arise
in user interface cases then the ultimate "look and feel" is-
sue must arise in operating system interface cases. As mil-
lions of PC users embraced Windows 3.0 and beyond, the
struggle for legal control of the graphical interface quickly
escalated. Clearly the implications were not lost on Judge
Walker:
The underlying economic and legal issue in copy-
right is the tradeoff between the social benefits of in-
creased production of useful ideas brought about by
giving a copyright holder the monopoly protection af-
forded copyrighted works and the social costs imposed
by raising the marginal cost of using copyrighted works.
Courts are repeatedly called upon to resolve the ten-
sions inherent in this tradeoff.278
At the very least, the GUI wars which played out in the
district court in San Francisco have highlighted those ten-
sions. The irony is that as the Windows litigation made its
painfully slow journey from motion to motion, copyright
law as it applies to computer software was making rapid
progress. That progress primarily was in the area of
copyrightability. Not only did the courts demonstrate re-
newed vigor in applying the idea-expression dichotomy, but
277. For example, Microsoft was recently denied trademark protection for Win-
dows, for which it applied in 1990. Protection was refused on the basis that Win-
dows was already a term of art in the computer industry when Microsoft introduced
Windows 1.0. "[T]he evidence clearly demonstrates that the public understands the
term Windows to refer to a genus of goods, namely computer software which utilizes
windows on a computer screen. . . ." Edmond L. Andrews, Microsoft Trademark
Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1993, at D1 (quoting U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice). Microsoft has announced an appeal. Shawn Willet, Microsoft to Appeal De-
nial of Windows Trademark, INFOWORLD, Mar. 1, 1993, at 3. Microsoft has also
issued a statement that it "gained ownership of the Windows trademark through its
extensive use of the mark and industry wide recognition of its successful Windows
product." James Coates, Microsoft Tries to Close a Window to Competitors, CH.
TRIa., Mar. 1, 1993, at C3.
Changes in traditional legal protections for computer products have led to re-
newed interest in trade secret law. See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, More Trade Secret
Laws, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22, 1993, at 1.
278. Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1544-45 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (citation and footnote omitted).
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also it significantly loaded, on the front-end, the infringe-
ment analysis with the copyrightability inquiry.
Clearly, the Windows case was decided on the basis
that "look and feel" will not preclude analytic dissection.
As Judge Walker himself asserted:
Without dispute, a copier may not make "immaterial
variations" and thereby escape copyright liability...
and, to this limited extent, there is some legitimacy to a
"look and feel" test, a point this court previously recog-
nized .... But this test should be applied only after
protectible expression has been identified, not before,
as Apple would have this court do.279
If dissection is the clearest barrier to comprehensive
protection of the computer interface, it is a barrier that
Judge Walker erected with great care in the Windows litiga-
tion. In large part dissection was inevitable because the li-
censing agreement had to be interpreted. Crucially, it was
mandated because of the Ninth Circuit's extrinsic test as
most recently expressed in Brown Bag. It is no coincidence
that the district court in Brown Bag28° took a very similar
approach to Judge Walker in the Windows case, 281 an ap-
proach that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit.282
The specifics of dissection aside, Apple's greatest en-
emy was time. When first filed in March 1988, Apple's the-
ory of liability was consistent with the leading software
279. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp 1006, 1026 n.16
(N.D. Cal. 1992); cf. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo.
1992), rev'd and remanded in part, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993). In Gates, the court
stated that the extrinsic and intrinsic tests would be followed by the "abstractions"
test, "to ensure that the substantial similarity test, and in particular the two-pronged
test, does not allow for the protection of any unprotectable ideas .... " Id. at 1513-
14. The court considered that this dissection phase should follow the two-prong test,
considering that to do it beforehand would run counter to established caselaw and
would eviscerate the substantial similarity test. Id. at 1516-17.
280. Sub. nom. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., No. C-88-20352-
RPA, 1989 WL 200350 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1989).
281. However, overall "look and feel" had not been argued before the district
court in Brown Bag on the particular summary judgment motion that precipitated
the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d
1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992).
282. Professor Samuelson has suggested that Brown Bag was a decisive factor in
Judge Walker's approach to his April 1992 rulings. Pamela Samuelson, Updating
The Copyright Look And Feel Lawsuits, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM. Sept.,
1992, at 25.
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caselaw. By the time Judge Walker issued his opinion in
August, 1992, copyright law had evolved past the Apple
assertions.
